

24,53

Rf Pm

The Department of State

RECEIVED  
JAN 7 1954  
MIAMI UNIVERSITY  
LIBRARY

# bulletin

EX. No. 756

Jan 21, 1954

ATOMIC POWER FOR PEACE • *Address by the President* . . . . . 847

FORCES FOR CHANGE IN THE CARIBBEAN • *by  
Assistant Secretary Cabot* . . . . . 855

LEADERS OF U.S., U.K., FRANCE MEET IN BER-  
MUDA • *Text of Communiqué* . . . . . 851

FORCED LABOR IN THE SOVIET UNION • *Statements  
by Mrs. Oswald B. Lord* . . . . . 865



For index see inside back cover

513129/756



# *The Department of State* bulletin

VOL. XXIX, No. 756 • PUBLICATION 5315

December 21, 1953

---

***The Department of State BULLETIN, a weekly publication issued by the Public Services Division, provides the public and interested agencies of the Government with information on developments in the field of foreign relations and on the work of the Department of State and the Foreign Service. The BULLETIN includes selected press releases on foreign policy, issued by the White House and the Department, and statements and addresses made by the President and by the Secretary of State and other officers of the Department, as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become a party and treaties of general international interest.***

***Publications of the Department, as well as legislative material in the field of international relations, are listed currently.***

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents  
U.S. Government Printing Office  
Washington 25, D.C.

PRICE:

52 issues, domestic \$7.50, foreign \$10.25  
Single copy, 20 cents

The printing of this publication has been approved by the Director of the Bureau of the Budget (January 22, 1952).

**Note:** Contents of this publication are not copyrighted and items contained herein may be reprinted. Citation of the DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN as the source will be appreciated.

At

W  
tatio  
me i  
conf  
Minis  
subj  
worl

D  
ence,  
lay a  
stand  
semb

At  
tion

Ne  
so m  
orga  
durin  
part

Bu  
ment  
tatio  
office  
you t  
rema  
we sh  
a gre  
faith  
for a  
all m

Cle  
this c

<sup>1</sup> Ma  
availa  
sale b  
ment 1

Decen

## Atomic Power for Peace

### *Address by the President<sup>1</sup>*

When Secretary-General Hammarskjold's invitation to address this General Assembly reached me in Bermuda, I was just beginning a series of conferences with the Prime Ministers and Foreign Ministers of Great Britain and of France. Our subject was some of the problems that beset our world.

During the remainder of the Bermuda Conference, I had constantly in mind that ahead of me lay a great honor. That honor is mine today as I stand here, privileged to address the General Assembly of the United Nations.

At the same time that I appreciate the distinction of addressing you, I have a sense of exhilaration as I look upon this Assembly.

Never before in history has so much hope for so many people been gathered together in a single organization. Your deliberations and decisions during these somber years have already realized part of those hopes.

But the great tests and the great accomplishments still lie ahead. And in the confident expectation of those accomplishments, I would use the office which, for the time being, I hold, to assure you that the Government of the United States will remain steadfast in its support of this body. This we shall do in the conviction that you will provide a great share of the wisdom, the courage, and the faith which can bring to this world lasting peace for all nations, and happiness and well being for all men.

Clearly, it would not be fitting for me to take this occasion to present to you a unilateral Amer-

ican report on Bermuda. Nevertheless, I assure you that in our deliberations on that lovely island we sought to invoke those same great concepts of universal peace and human dignity which are so cleanly etched in your Charter.

Neither would it be a measure of this great opportunity merely to recite, however hopefully, pious platitudes.

### **A Danger Shared by All**

I therefore decided that this occasion warranted my saying to you some of the things that have been on the minds and hearts of my legislative and executive associates and on mine for a great many months—thoughts I had originally planned to say primarily to the American people.

I know that the American people share my deep belief that if a danger exists in the world, it is a danger shared by all—and equally, that if hope exists in the mind of one nation, that hope should be shared by all.

Finally, if there is to be advanced any proposal designed to ease even by the smallest measure the tensions of today's world, what more appropriate audience could there be than the members of the General Assembly of the United Nations?

I feel impelled to speak today in a language that in a sense is new—one which I, who have spent so much of my life in the military profession, would have preferred never to use.

That new language is the language of atomic warfare.

The atomic age has moved forward at such a pace that every citizen of the world should have some comprehension, at least in comparative terms, of the extent of this development, of the utmost significance to every one of us. Clearly,

<sup>1</sup>Made before the U.N. General Assembly on Dec. 8; also available as Department of State publication 5314, for sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington 25, D.C. (10 cents).

if the peoples of the world are to conduct an intelligent search for peace, they must be armed with the significant facts of today's existence.

My recital of atomic danger and power is necessarily stated in United States terms, for these are the only incontrovertible facts that I know. I need hardly point out to this Assembly, however, that this subject is global, not merely national in character.

#### The Fearful Potentials

On July 16, 1945, the United States set off the world's first atomic explosion.

Since that date in 1945, the United States of America has conducted 42 test explosions.

Atomic bombs today are more than 25 times as powerful as the weapons with which the atomic age dawned, while hydrogen weapons are in the ranges of millions of tons of TNT equivalent.

Today, the United States' stockpile of atomic weapons, which, of course, increases daily, exceeds by many times the explosive equivalent of the total of all bombs and all shells that came from every plane and every gun in every theatre of war in all of the years of World War II.

A single air group, whether afloat or land-based, can now deliver to any reachable target a destructive cargo exceeding in power all the bombs that fell on Britain in all of World War II.

In size and variety, the development of atomic weapons has been no less remarkable. The development has been such that atomic weapons have virtually achieved conventional status within our armed services. In the United States, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and the Marine Corps are all capable of putting this weapon to military use.

But the dread secret, and the fearful engines of atomic might, are not ours alone.

In the first place, the secret is possessed by our friends and allies, Great Britain and Canada, whose scientific genius made a tremendous contribution to our original discoveries, and the designs of atomic bombs.

The secret is also known by the Soviet Union.

The Soviet Union has informed us that, over recent years, it has devoted extensive resources to atomic weapons. During this period, the Soviet Union has exploded a series of atomic devices, in-

cluding at least one involving thermo-nuclear reactions.

#### No Monopoly of Atomic Power

If at one time the United States possessed what might have been called a monopoly of atomic power, that monopoly ceased to exist several years ago. Therefore, although our earlier start has permitted us to accumulate what is today a great quantitative advantage, the atomic realities of today comprehend two facts of even greater significance.

First, the knowledge now possessed by several nations will eventually be shared by others—possibly all others.

Second, even a vast superiority in numbers of weapons, and a consequent capability of devastating retaliation, is no preventive, of itself, against the fearful material damage and toll of human lives that would be inflicted by surprise aggression.

The free world, at least dimly aware of these facts, has naturally embarked on a large program of warning and defense systems. That program will be accelerated and expanded.

But let no one think that the expenditure of vast sums for weapons and systems of defense can guarantee absolute safety for the cities and citizens of any nation. The awful arithmetic of the atomic bomb does not permit of any such easy solution. Even against the most powerful defense, an aggressor in possession of the effective minimum number of atomic bombs for a surprise attack could probably place a sufficient number of his bombs on the chosen targets to cause hideous damage.

Should such an atomic attack be launched against the United States, our reactions would be swift and resolute. But for me to say that the defense capabilities of the United States are such that they could inflict terrible losses upon an aggressor—for me to say that the retaliation capabilities of the United States are so great that such an aggressor's land would be laid waste—all this, while fact, is not the true expression of the purpose and the hope of the United States.

To pause there would be to confirm the hopeless finality of a belief that two atomic colossi are doomed malevolently to eye each other indefinitely across a trembling world. To stop there would be to accept helplessly the probability of civilization destroyed—the annihilation of the irreplace-

able heritage of mankind handed down to us from generation to generation—and the condemnation of mankind to begin all over again the age-old struggle upward from savagery toward decency, and right, and justice.

Surely no sane member of the human race could discover victory in such desolation. Could anyone wish his name to be coupled by history with such human degradation and destruction.

Occasional pages of history do record the faces of the "Great Destroyers" but the whole book of history reveals mankind's never-ending quest for peace, and mankind's God-given capacity to build.

It is with the book of history, and not with isolated pages, that the United States will ever wish to be identified. My country wants to be constructive, not destructive. It wants agreements, not wars, among nations. It wants itself to live in freedom, and in the confidence that the people of every other nation enjoy equally the right of choosing their own way of life.

#### No Idle Words or Shallow Visions

So my country's purpose is to help us move out of the dark chamber of horrors into the light, to find a way by which the minds of men, the hopes of men, the souls of men everywhere, can move forward toward peace and happiness and well being.

In this quest, I know that we must not lack patience.

I know that in a world divided, such as ours today, salvation cannot be attained by one dramatic act.

I know that many steps will have to be taken over many months before the world can look at itself one day and truly realize that a new climate of mutually peaceful confidence is abroad in the world.

But I know, above all else, that we must start to take these steps—NOW.

The United States and its allies, Great Britain and France, have over the past months tried to take some of these steps. Let no one say that we shun the conference table.

On the record has long stood the request of the United States, Great Britain, and France to negotiate with the Soviet Union the problems of a divided Germany.

On that record has long stood the request of the same three nations to negotiate an Austrian State Treaty.

December 21, 1953

On the same record still stands the request of the United Nations to negotiate the problems of Korea.

Most recently, we have received from the Soviet Union what is in effect an expression of willingness to hold a Four Power Meeting. Along with our allies, Great Britain and France, we were pleased to see that this note did not contain the unacceptable pre-conditions previously put forward.

As you already know from our joint Bermuda communique, the United States, Great Britain, and France have agreed promptly to meet with the Soviet Union.

The Government of the United States approaches this conference with hopeful sincerity. We will bend every effort of our minds to the single purpose of emerging from that conference with tangible results toward peace—the only true way of lessening international tension.

We never have, we never will, propose or suggest that the Soviet Union surrender what is rightfully theirs.

We will never say that the peoples of Russia are an enemy with whom we have no desire ever to deal or mingle in friendly and fruitful relationship.

On the contrary, we hope that this Conference may initiate a relationship with the Soviet Union which will eventually bring about a free intermingling of the peoples of the East and of the West—the one sure, human way of developing the understanding required for confident and peaceful relations.

Instead of the discontent which is now settling upon Eastern Germany, occupied Austria, and the countries of Eastern Europe, we seek a harmonious family of free European nations, with none a threat to the other, and least of all a threat to the peoples of Russia.

Beyond the turmoil and strife and misery of Asia, we seek peaceful opportunity for these peoples to develop their natural resources and to elevate their lives.

These are not idle words or shallow visions. Behind them lies a story of nations lately come to independence, not as a result of war, but through free grant or peaceful negotiation. There is a record, already written, of assistance gladly given by nations of the West to needy peoples, and to those suffering the temporary effects of famine, drought, and natural disaster.

These are deeds of peace. They speak more loudly than promises or protestations of peaceful intent.

#### For the Benefit of Mankind

But I do not wish to rest either upon the reiteration of past proposals or the restatement of past deeds. The gravity of the time is such that every new avenue of peace, no matter how dimly discernible, should be explored.

There is at least one new avenue of peace which has not yet been well explored—an avenue now laid out by the General Assembly of the United Nations.

In its resolution of November 28, 1953,<sup>2</sup> this General Assembly suggested—and I quote—"that the Disarmament Commission study the desirability of establishing a subcommittee consisting of representatives of the Powers principally involved, which should seek in private an acceptable solution . . . and report on such a solution to the General Assembly and to the Security Council not later than 1 September 1954."

The United States, heeding the suggestion of the General Assembly of the United Nations, is instantly prepared to meet privately with such other countries as may be "principally involved," to seek "an acceptable solution" to the atomic armaments race which overshadows not only the peace, but the very life, of the world.

We shall carry into these private or diplomatic talks a new conception.

The United States would seek more than the mere reduction or elimination of atomic materials for military purposes.

It is not enough to take this weapon out of the hands of the soldiers. It must be put into the hands of those who will know how to strip its military casing and adapt it to the arts of peace.

The United States knows that if the fearful trend of atomic military buildup can be reversed, this greatest of destructive forces can be developed into a great boon, for the benefit of all mankind.

The United States knows that peaceful power from atomic energy is no dream of the future. That capability, already proved, is here—now—today. Who can doubt, if the entire body of the world's scientists and engineers had adequate

amounts of fissionable material with which to test and develop their ideas, that this capability would rapidly be transformed into universal, efficient, and economic usage.

To hasten the day when fear of the atom will begin to disappear from the minds of people, and the governments of the East and West, there are certain steps that can be taken now.

#### Proposal for Joint Atomic Contributions

I therefore make the following proposals:

The Governments principally involved, to the extent permitted by elementary prudence, to begin now and continue to make joint contributions from their stockpiles of normal uranium and fissionable materials to an International Atomic Energy Agency. We would expect that such an agency would be set up under the aegis of the United Nations.

The ratios of contributions, the procedures and other details would properly be within the scope of the "private conversations" I have referred to earlier.

The United States is prepared to undertake these explorations in good faith. Any partner of the United States acting in the same good faith will find the United States a not unreasonable or ungenerous associate.

Undoubtedly initial and early contributions to this plan would be small in quantity. However, the proposal has the great virtue that it can be undertaken without the irritations and mutual suspicions incident to any attempt to set up a completely acceptable system of world-wide inspection and control.

The Atomic Energy Agency could be made responsible for the impounding, storage, and protection of the contributed fissionable and other materials. The ingenuity of our scientists will provide special safe conditions under which such a bank of fissionable material can be made essentially immune to surprise seizure.

The more important responsibility of this Atomic Energy Agency would be to devise methods whereby this fissionable material would be allocated to serve the peaceful pursuits of mankind. Experts would be mobilized to apply atomic energy to the needs of agriculture, medicine, and other peaceful activities. A special purpose would be to provide abundant electrical energy in the

<sup>2</sup> BULLETIN of Dec. 14, 1953, p. 838.

power-starved areas of the world. Thus the contributing powers would be dedicating some of their strength to serve the needs rather than the fears of mankind.

The United States would be more than willing—it would be proud to take up with others "principally involved" the development of plans whereby such peaceful use of atomic energy would be expedited.

Of those "principally involved" the Soviet Union must, of course, be one.

#### **Out of Fear and Into Peace**

I would be prepared to submit to the Congress of the United States, and with every expectation of approval, any such plan that would:

First—encourage world-wide investigation into the most effective peacetime uses of fissionable material, and with the certainty that they had all the material needed for the conduct of all experiments that were appropriate;

Second—begin to diminish the potential destructive power of the world's atomic stockpiles;

Third—allow all peoples of all nations to see that, in this enlightened age, the great powers of the earth, both of the East and of the West, are interested in human aspirations first, rather than in building up the armaments of war;

Fourth—open up a new channel for peaceful discussion, and initiate at least a new approach to the many difficult problems that must be solved in both private and public conversations, if the world is to shake off the inertia imposed by fear, and is to make positive progress toward peace.

Against the dark background of the atomic bomb, the United States does not wish merely to present strength, but also the desire and the hope for peace.

The coming months will be fraught with fateful decisions. In this Assembly; in the capitals and military headquarters of the world; in the hearts of men everywhere, be they governors or governed, may they be the decisions which will lead this world out of fear and into peace.

To the making of these fateful decisions, the United States pledges before you—and therefore before the world—its determination to help solve the fearful atomic dilemma—to devote its entire heart and mind to find the way by which the miraculous inventiveness of man shall not be dedicated to his death, but consecrated to his life.

## **Soviet Reaction to U.S. Atomic Proposal**

*Statement by James O. Hagerty  
Press Secretary to the President*

White House press release dated December 10

We do not believe that immediate reactions to President Eisenhower's atomic proposal necessarily represent the considered decision of the Soviet Government. After all, the President always recognized that his suggestion would require thoughtful study. Therefore any 24-hour reactions by Soviet officials or by Soviet propaganda media cannot be accepted as anything more than stopgap interim statements.<sup>1</sup> We are still very hopeful that the Soviet leaders will recognize the President's proposal for what it is—a serious and feasible first step toward atomic peace.

## **Leaders of U.S., U.K., France Meet in Bermuda**

#### **Text of Communiqué**

The President of the United States, the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom and the President of the Council of Ministers of the French Republic, accompanied by the Foreign Ministers of the three countries, met in Bermuda from the 4th to 7th of December, 1953. At their meeting they discussed their policies regarding many parts of the world where their countries have obligations. On

<sup>1</sup> On Dec. 9 a Moscow Radio political commentator, Boris Leontyev, had said: "It is clear that the United States does not want to bring about an international *détente*. The warmongering speech of President Eisenhower and the attitude adopted in the United Nations by the United States delegation proves this sufficiently."

On Dec. 12 the Moscow Radio broadcast the following statement by the Soviet Foreign Ministry:

"On December 7 Mr. Bohlen, Ambassador of the United States of America, visited Vyacheslav Mikhailovich Molotov, U.S.S.R. Minister of Foreign Affairs, and told him of a speech to be made December 8 by President Eisenhower in the General Assembly of the United Nations on the question of atomic armaments.

"On behalf of his government, the Ambassador requested that attention be given to proposals which would be made in the speech of the United States President.

"Having thanked the Ambassador for the information, V. M. Molotov said the question of atomic weapons was a very important matter and that the Soviet government would give the speech of the United States President on that question serious attention, as it had done in similar cases in the past.

"On December 9, in a letter addressed to V. M. Molotov, Mr. Bohlen sent excerpts from the above speech by President Eisenhower."

the conclusion of the Conference they issued the following statement:

### II.

Our meetings symbolized and confirmed the unity of purpose of our three countries. We found ourselves in accord on our analysis of the problems confronting us and have agreed on various measures essential for their solution.

Confident that our united strength is the best guarantee of peace and security we are resolved to maintain our joint efforts to perfect it. If the danger of aggression now appears less imminent, we attribute this to the mounting strength of the free world and the firmness of its policies.

We shall remain resolute in maintaining our solidarity and vigilant against efforts to divide us.

With their material and moral resources we are confident that the free peoples can provide both for their security and for their well being. We dedicate ourselves to work together towards these ends.

### III.

The North Atlantic Treaty is and will remain the foundation of our common policy. We discussed means of developing the defensive capacity of our Alliance. Lord Ismay, the Secretary-General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, was present at the conversations on this subject.

In the continuing development of a United Europe, including Germany, we see the best means of achieving greater prosperity, security and stability for its free peoples. We reaffirmed that the European Defence Community is needed to assure the defensive capacity of the Atlantic Community of which it will be an integral part. Within this framework it will ensure intimate and durable cooperation between the United Kingdom and United States forces and the forces of the European Defence Community on the Continent of Europe. The French Minister of Foreign Affairs explained the problems facing his Government in regard to the European Defence Community.

We cannot accept as justified or permanent the present division of Europe. Our hope is that in due course peaceful means will be found to enable the countries of Eastern Europe again to play their part as free nations in a free Europe.

### IV.

Our three Governments will lose no opportunity for easing the tensions that beset the world and for reassuring all nations that they have no cause to fear that the strength of the West will be invoked in any cause of wrongful violence. On the contrary it is the fundamental principle of the United Nations Organisation, which we serve, that the guarantees against aggression shall be universal in their application.

We are confident that if we remain strong, united and steadfast it will become possible grad-

ually to solve the stubborn problems which have too long been unsettled.

In this spirit we have examined the latest note from the Soviet Government. We approved the text of our replies, which should lead to an early meeting of the four Foreign Ministers. Our hope is that this meeting will make progress towards the reunification of Germany in freedom and the conclusion of an Austrian State Treaty and thus towards the solution of other major international problems.

### V.

We reviewed the situation in the Far East. The immediate object of our policy continues to be the convening of the political conference provided for in the Korean Armistice agreement. This would provide the means for reaching a peaceful settlement of the Korean question and for making progress in restoring more normal conditions in the Far East and South East Asia.

In Indo-China we salute the valiant forces of France and of the three Associated States of Indo-China fighting within the French Union to protect the independence of Cambodia, Laos and Viet-Nam. We recognise the vital importance of their contribution to the defence of the free world. We will continue to work together to restore peace and stability in this area.

### VI.

Our meetings have reinforced our solidarity, strengthened our resolve, and fortified our hopes. Confident in our common purposes and united in our views we shall persevere in our policies, whose sole aim is to foster and assure peace.

## Western Allies Propose That Four Powers Meet in January

### U.S. Note of December 8

Press release 655 dated December 8

*Following is the text of a note approved by the Foreign Ministers of the United States, the United Kingdom, and France, meeting at Bermuda, which U.S. Ambassador Charles E. Bohlen, on behalf of the United States, delivered to the Soviet Foreign Ministry on December 8. His British and French colleagues delivered identical notes on behalf of their respective governments.*

The United States Government is glad to learn from the Soviet Government's note of November 26 that it is now prepared to take part in a meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the United Kingdom, United States, France and the Soviet Union. It is its hope that this meeting will lead towards

the reunification of Germany in freedom and to the conclusion of an Austrian State Treaty.

The United States Government is confident that real progress towards the settlement of the German and Austrian questions, which are especially urgent, will contribute to the solution of other major international problems, including that of European security. In this connection, the United States Government reaffirms that the voluntary association of the free countries of the Atlantic alliance and the actions of certain European states for developing their prosperity and ensuring their joint security are exclusively defensive and a collective contribution to peace.

The Soviet Government has stated its desire to discuss the possibility of a five-power conference. The forthcoming meeting of the four Foreign Ministers will enable any participating government to state its views on this question.

The United States Government, having consulted with the German Federal Government and the German authorities in Berlin, proposes that the meeting of the four Foreign Ministers should begin on January 4, 1954, in the building which was used by the Allied Control Council in Berlin.

#### Soviet Note of November 26

[Unofficial translation]

The Soviet Government acknowledges the receipt of the note of the Government of the U.S.A. of November 16, 1953, which is an answer to the Soviet Government's note of November 3.<sup>1</sup>

The Government of the U.S.A. alleges that the Government of the U.S.S.R. has refused its proposal for a conference of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs on the most urgent international problems. Such an allegation does not correspond with reality, and it is in clear contradiction with what was said by the Soviet Government in its note of November 3.

As is known, in this note the Soviet Government not only did not refuse the proposal for a convocation of a conference of Ministers of Foreign Affairs on the most urgent international problems, but on the contrary it again affirmed its favorable attitude toward a convocation of such a conference although the proposal of the Government of the U.S.S.R. did not coincide with the proposal of the Government of the U.S.A.

The Soviet Government proposed the calling of a conference of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs and at that meeting:

"1. To examine measures for the reduction of tension in international relations with participation of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the United States of America, England, France, the Chinese People's Republic, and the Soviet Union;

"2. To consider the German question, including all the proposals advanced during the course of the preparations for the conference with the participation of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the United States of America, England, France, and the Soviet Union."

The Soviet Government considers it necessary to recall that it has repeatedly advanced its proposal for a convocation of a conference of the Ministers of Foreign

Affairs during the course of recent months, i. e., August 4, September 28, November 3.

Thus the Soviet Government has consistently insisted on a convocation of a conference of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs for the examination of the general question concerning measures for lessening tension in international relations and especially the German question, the decision of which is connected in the closest fashion with assuring security in Europe and, consequently, with lessening tension in the international situation. The Soviet Government at the present time still considers the convocation of such a conference necessary. Such a conference, according to the Soviet Government's opinion, should not be confined in advance to examination of any one question but should actually be able to examine the most urgent international problems.

The Soviet Government's proposal for the convocation of a conference with participation of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the U.S.A., England, France, the U.S.S.R., and the Chinese People's Republic for the examination of measures for lessening tension in international relations, and also with the participation of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the U.S.A., England, France, and the U.S.S.R. for consideration of the German question, was advanced with one general aim—to contribute to the easing of international tension and, in particular, to assuring stable security in Europe, which requires a definitive settlement of the German problem.

The Government of the U.S.A. also speaks of its desire for lessening international tension and also mentions as the most urgent questions the German problem, the conclusion of an Austrian state treaty, and cooperation in the convocation of a political conference in Korea. Even the listing of the above-mentioned problems shows that the Government of the U.S.A. regards the specific questions concerning Europe as well as the questions concerning Asia as among the most urgent international problems suitable for consideration at a Conference of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs.

Inasmuch as the U.S. Government has recognized that at a conference of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs it is also appropriate to examine those problems which concern the situation in Asia, then it follows that the participation of the Chinese People's Republic, together with the other four great powers, in the examination and settlement of such type of problems is completely natural and necessary. In addition, there is no basis to deny the obvious fact that the time has become ripe for the examination of measures for the lessening of tension in the international situation as a whole, towards which the persistent efforts of the Soviet Government are directed as well, and this means that a conference with the participation of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the U.S.A., England, France, the U.S.S.R., and the Chinese People's Republic is a matter which must not be put off.

It is exactly because the examination of the question of measures for easing the international situation as a whole is not only an urgent necessity but is also not to be postponed that the Soviet Government has considered and considers it necessary to convocate a conference with the participation of all the great powers without any exception whatsoever. As the U.S. Government states that it also is pursuing the aim of contributing to the easing of international tension, obstacles to a convocation of a conference of the five powers, the U.S.A., England, France, the U.S.S.R., and the Chinese People's Republic, should disappear. From this is also evident the whole baselessness of the objections contained in the note of November 16 on the question at hand.

The Government of the U.S.S.R. reaffirms the position stated in its note of November 3 concerning a meeting of Foreign Ministers.

In addition the Government of the U.S.S.R. again states that plans for the creation of the so-called "European army," opening the door to the rebirth of German militarism and the remilitarization of Western Germany together with the creation of foreign military bases on the territory of a number of European states which creates a

<sup>1</sup> For texts, see BULLETIN of Nov. 30, 1953, p. 745.

threat to the security of other European states, are incompatible with the interests of security in Europe.

The Soviet Government rejects as without any foundation the statement contained in the note of the U.S. Government of November 16 alleging that the negative attitude of the Soviet Union toward the creation of a European army represents a demand for "the abandonment by the U.S., U.K. and France of all their plans to safeguard their own security" although the position which the U.S.S.R. has stated in no way touches on the question of the military forces of these states. Equally unfounded is the statement clearly made for propaganda purposes alleging that "a defenseless Western Europe appears to be the price demanded by the Soviet Union for participation in a conference."

As is well known, an attempt is being made under the label of "a European army" to create an army of six states: France, Western Germany, Italy, Belgium, Netherlands, and Luxembourg. Consequently, this plan envisages the creation of an army of a narrow groupement of European states which does not include the majority of European countries. Moreover, the principal purpose of creating a European army is to make possible the reestablishment of a regular army in Western Germany, with a West German Army included as a basic military force in the above-mentioned European army. The creation of a European army is being supported in every way by former Hitlerites and other German revanchists who in order to serve their aggressive purpose are striving to prepare the unleashing of a new war and involve in it not only the German people but also the other peoples of Europe since the creation of a European army will be forced on them.

The danger of carrying out this plan of creating a European army must be understandable to all the peoples of Europe, including the peoples of those countries which are now being involved in the creation of this army, since it is clear that under the cover of the so-called "European army" the army of German militarism is being revived. The creation of a European army can mean nothing but the creation of an aggressive groupement of several European states which, relying on armed forces and including in its composition the West German revanchists army, will set itself in opposition to a whole series of other European states: the Soviet Union, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and other countries. By the same token the plan for the creation of a European army can in no way assist the strengthening of peace in Europe. Such a plan includes setting one part of Europe against the other part of Europe. It cannot lead to lessening tension in international relations but, on the contrary, will contribute to inflaming contradictions between the countries of Europe and thereby increasing the danger of a new military adventure. Thus, the creation of a European army unleashing the forces of German militarism, most dangerous for peace in Europe, will contain a threat of a new world war which the peace-loving peoples of the whole world cannot fail to take into account.

In opposing the so-called "European army" the Soviet Union proceeds from the fact that the creation of such an army can in no way contribute to strengthening of security in Europe but rather, inevitably, will lead to contrary results. Nor does the creation of such an army have anything in common with the desire not to permit a "defenseless Western Europe," which, moreover, no one is threatening.

The guaranteeing of the security of Western European countries will be firm if it is based not on setting countries of Western Europe off against countries of Eastern Europe but on obtaining concord of the efforts of all European countries in regard to assuring security in Europe. These efforts can and must be based on obligations previously assumed by the states concerned, the aim of which is to prevent new acts of aggression in Europe.

In opposing the creation of a European army the Soviet Union is acting in the interests of forestalling a threat of new war and, consequently, in the interests of securing a real peace in Europe.

The Soviet Union is ready to exert all efforts together with the other countries of Europe to cooperate in assuring European security by means of appropriate agreement between all the countries of Europe independently of their social structure. Security can be fully guaranteed for all European countries if the efforts of all European states and other states interested in this will make their efforts conform to these specific purposes. This also requires that the solution of the German problem, which has very important significance for the strengthening of security in Europe, will be carried out in the interests of reestablishing the unity and independence of Germany as a democratic and peace-loving state.

The foregoing permits the conclusion that inasmuch as the Governments of the United States of America and the U.S.S.R. are striving for the reinforcement of peace and international security they must be interested in the urgent examination of the questions of measures for the reduction of tension in international affairs in general, as well as in the specific examination of questions concerning security in Europe and the consequent resolution of the German problem. This was also the substance of the proposal of the Soviet Government in its note of November 3.

Since, however, the exchange of notes between the U.S.S.R. and the United States of America, and also with England and France, has not led, up to the present time, to the establishment of a common viewpoint in regard to the above-mentioned proposal, it is necessary to examine this question at an appropriate meeting of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs. In this connection, the Soviet Government has taken into consideration the statement contained in the note of the Government of the United States of November 16 to the effect that its participation in a conference of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the United States of America, the U.S.S.R., England, and France is not connected with any conditions of a preliminary character. Similar statements were made by the Governments of England and France. Being guided by the desire to cooperate in the speedy settlement of urgent international problems, the Soviet Government expresses its readiness to take part in a meeting of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the United States of America, the U.S.S.R., England, and France.

The Soviet Government considers it necessary to declare that, in the light of the considerations set forth above, at this meeting there will be brought up by it the question of the convocation in the near future of a meeting of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the United States of America, England, France, the U.S.S.R. and the Chinese People's Republic for the purpose of reducing tension in international relations. In the opinion of the Soviet Government, a suitable place for the meeting of the Ministers of the four powers could be the city of Berlin. The Soviet Government has sent similar notes also to the Governments of England and France.

## Meeting of NATO Ministers

### Statement by Secretary Dulles<sup>1</sup>

I am leaving for Paris to attend a meeting of the Ministers of the 14 NATO countries. Secretary Humphrey, Secretary Wilson, and Mr. Stassen will also be there.

These meetings have now become a well-established practice within the Atlantic alliance. They

<sup>1</sup> Made at the National Airport, Washington, D. C., on Dec. 11 (press release 660).

are working meetings, where we review past progress and plan ahead.

Already much has been done. NATO started with small forces. Now it is strong. But its strength needs to be maintained and developed.

The President's great address of last Tuesday boldly charted a way to reduce the great peril of our time. We hope others will follow in that way. In any case, progress will of necessity be gradual. In the meantime it is essential to maintain the power to defend against and strike back against any aggressor. It is largely through NATO that we gain that power, in the common interest. It is vital to the United States to have these strong and loyal NATO allies, and we work with them confidently as effective partners for peace.

#### **U.S. Delegation**

The Department of State announced on December 10 (press release 657) that the U.S. representatives to the ministerial meeting of the North Atlantic Council at Paris December 14-16 would

be John Foster Dulles, Secretary of State, George M. Humphrey, Secretary of the Treasury, Charles E. Wilson, Secretary of Defense, and Harold E. Stassen, Director, Foreign Operations Administration. They will be assisted by John C. Hughes, U.S. permanent representative on the Council, and the following principal advisers:

Theodore C. Achilles, U.S. Chargé d'Affaires ad interim at Paris

W. Randolph Burgess, Consultant and Deputy to the Secretary of the Treasury

David K. E. Bruce, United States Observer to the Interim Committee of the European Defense Community and United States Representative to the European Coal and Steel Community

J. Lawton Collins, General, U.S.A., United States Representative on the Military Committee

Douglas MacArthur II, Counselor, Department of State

Edwin M. Martin, Alternate United States Permanent Representative on the North Atlantic Council

Carl W. McCordle, Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs

Livingston T. Merchant, Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs

Frank C. Nash, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs

John H. Ohly, Deputy Director for Program and Planning, Foreign Operations Administration

## **Forces for Change in the Caribbean**

by John M. Cabot

Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs<sup>1</sup>

In the Caribbean area, as in every other part of the world, we face the implacable challenge of communism. If in general we are meeting it successfully in this area, communism has none the less established one center of infection, and there are some circumstances which favor its spread elsewhere. From the viewpoint of our national security, there is practically no area which is more vital to us. When we think of the cold war, let us not think only of the far-flung front lines on the Elbe, in the Caucasus, about Hanoi, or north of the 38th parallel, where our forces so recently threw back Communist aggression. The Caribbean region is our innermost defense area against the enormous totalitarian threat we face and must continue to face.

What is the substance of the Caribbean area? Some 12 independent republics and several European dependencies. On the mainland a Spanish civilization superimposed on an Indian. On the islands, including the dependencies, a Spanish, French, English, and Dutch civilization on a more or less broad Negro base. Histories older and more romantic than ours; exotic cultures with colorful Indian and Negro influences resurgent beneath the long prevailing European domination; economics based on the produce of tropics and mines; governments which, because of their defects and difficulties, have been unable to satisfy their people's needs; a history of instability, foreign interference, backwardness—but of aspiration to better things. The unrest caused by those aspirations is the key to the Caribbean story today.

We should not fool ourselves that Soviet communism was the major force which produced that

<sup>1</sup> Address made before the Conference on the Caribbean at the University of Florida, Gainesville, Fla., on Dec. 3 (press release 648 dated Dec. 2).

unrest. We ourselves were primarily responsible. On the remotest shore of these sparkling seas the most ignorant peon was aware of our wealth, our power, our impact on his life. To him we brought such new ideas as equality before the law, individual freedom and dignity, education for all, a fabulous standard of living for the masses; and we distributed these ideas in his feudal society by such typical American vehicles as the auto, the movie, the radio, the airplane. Through our businessmen developing the resources of the Caribbean region, the same unspoken message reached the people.

When there are great disparities between rich and poor in a community, there is not likely to be much understanding between them. Neither seeks to analyze the other side with understanding and compassion. Great disparities exist between the power and wealth of the United States and that of most of the Caribbean republics, and equally great disparities exist in the living standards of individual citizens. These disparities have had very marked repercussions on relations in the Caribbean area.

If we did not invariably respect the rights and interests of the Caribbean republics as we do today, we did sympathize with our neighboring sister peoples in their desire to win and maintain their independence. We did help them with material aid on several critical occasions when they were threatened with foreign domination. We helped win Cuba's independence with our blood, and we have now given Puerto Rico the full autonomy they themselves have chosen. We never sought to take advantage of the weakness of our small neighbors to annex them as colonies.

Unhappily independence is not enough. On the one hand, national independence did not mean individual freedom, as the Caribbean republics quickly discovered; on the other, with nations as with individuals, independence is inseparable from a sense of responsibility. Those factors basically have molded the history of the Caribbean republics since they won their independence; as never before they pose the basic question today.

Throughout the area social conditions were still feudal when modern influences began invading it. A small upper class of landowners, soldiers, prelates, politicians, to whom a few native and foreign businessmen had but recently been added; an almost nonexistent middle class; and great masses living in abject poverty and virtual peonage. The gap between the Spanish descent of the upper classes and the Indian or Negro origins of the masses added to the explosiveness of the mixture. Though not lacking in natural resources, they were almost totally lacking in native capital. They lacked roads, railways, utilities, industries, and even the major staple exports which, directly or indirectly, would bring the capital for their development.

#### Attraction of Foreign Capital

Into this Arcadian society foreign capital was attracted by the opportunities it afforded and the deliberate policies of the local governments. It developed railways, mines, sugar production, utilities, banana plantations, oil. If it had no more fully developed social sense than had capital in Europe and in the United States at that period, it did in general behave not worse but better than the prevailing standards in the countries to which it went. In particular, it generally found that to attract labor to distant, desolate places, it had to pay better than prevailing wages and offer better than prevailing working conditions; and in its own interests it often had to provide hospitals, housing, and schools. It developed the jungle and the desert; it produced important exports; it built the railways and utilities which theretofore had been almost totally lacking and which many of the Caribbean peoples would scarcely have had today if they had had to depend on their own resources. If most of the Caribbean republics are still relatively poor, it is to be remembered that they started far worse off than they are today and that their progress has been increasingly rapid.

These massive injections of foreign capital into hands theretofore almost totally devoid of capital also produced grave problems. The governments were weak, unstable, often venal; the mass of the people had a long record of submission to authority. Because of the risks and the scarcity of capital, high returns on it were normal and in the prevailing circumstances unsavory deals by no means unknown. But the introduction of large foreign capital investments brought in new factors. Their very size gave them a vital position in the countries' economies; and, given the political, economic, and ethical conditions prevailing in the Caribbean area at that time, they could scarcely have avoided using their financial power for their own ends even if they had wished to do so. Moreover, this capital was backed by powerful foreign governments; those governments were by no means loath to use force to protect it, and in fact numerous foreign interventions occurred. If these were often provoked by the despoiling of foreign capital, on other occasions they were merely the pretext for imperialist adventures. American capital had a better record than European capital in this regard, perhaps in part because it entered the field later.

Recognizing the dangers of extracontinental intervention to the Monroe Doctrine and the excuses for it afforded by disorder in the Caribbean area, Theodore Roosevelt in effect announced during his administration that the United States would see to it that order was maintained in the Caribbean area, and thereafter a series of interventions were undertaken to reestablish order and inculcate democracy in several of the Carib-

bean  
were  
fores  
princ  
to sti  
Amer  
solem  
affair  
pulow  
throu

Int  
tion  
selve  
today  
area  
not s  
each  
to ter  
demo  
they  
and i

By  
and t  
revol  
again  
neigh  
is am  
the A  
massi  
contr  
over,  
had a

The F  
To  
ments  
revolu  
simila  
sound  
real n  
never  
wisely  
worki  
force  
imper

Con  
Carib  
it can  
comm  
invest  
a shor  
Carib  
should  
count  
exploit  
campai

\*1. e  
can Sta  
of Sta

Decem

bean republics. Our efforts to impose democracy were notably unsuccessful, as we should have foreseen from the very nature of democracy. The principal effect of our well-intentioned efforts was to stir up a hornet's nest for us throughout Latin America. Finally, at Montevideo in 1938<sup>2</sup> we solemnly agreed not to intervene in the internal affairs of our sister republics, and we have scrupulously respected that pledge since that date throughout the area which we are discussing.

Into this unbalanced, rapidly developing situation American ideas increasingly thrust themselves. These ideas, which we accept for ourselves today without a single thought, were as revolutionary in the conditions existing in the Caribbean area as they were for us in 1775. The masses did not stop to think out to a nicety the equities of each case; they had no long democratic tradition to temper and guide their emotions; they had no democratic processes to enable them to get what they thought they should have by peaceful means, and in remediating abuses they made many mistakes.

By no accident Mexico, as our closest neighbor and the country of greatest extremes, flamed into revolution in 1911. In the following events, we again learned the unwise of interfering in our neighbors' affairs. Today a transformed Mexico is among the most progressive and prosperous of the American Republics, and to that prosperity massive infusions of United States capital have contributed importantly. In recent years, moreover, no other country in the Caribbean area has had a record of greater political stability.

#### The Force of Communist Imperialism

Today we face in many Caribbean lands movements which have some similarity to the Mexican revolution—and which also have fundamental dissimilarities. We should never fail to recognize the sound impulses which seek change, betterment, or real national identity in that area, and we should never try to block these forces insofar as they are wisely directed. But today there is another force working overtime in the Caribbean region—the force of that modern colonialism, Communist imperialism.

Communism has nothing to offer people in the Caribbean area except false promises. It will not, it cannot, bring better living standards to the common man anywhere. By robbing the foreign investor, it could give the workman a bit more for a short time and destroy his job. But those in the Caribbean area who listen to Communist agitation should remember the Communist record in the countries they control—the long, sad tale of exploitation and forced labor and concentration camps and living standards lower than they were

when the Communists seized power. Even in the 18th century unbridled exploitation was not well regarded by Europe—note the trial of Warren Hastings. No colonial power has ever exploited the people of its colonies as the Communists exploit their own people. How many voices are raised today in Soviet Russia to defend the rights of slave laborers?

Let us nevertheless not deceive ourselves as to the allure of Communist propaganda.

The present generation in our neighboring republics has forgotten what conditions were like before foreign capital came in to provide them facilities, employment, and exports. Many of them have no appreciation of what it means to them and to their countries' progress. The Communists seek to exploit the unthinking emotions of the still backward people. They know that in no other area of the world has a great power shown such respect for the rights of weak neighbors as has the United States for the smaller Caribbean republics. They know that in no other area have such diverse nations cooperated more harmoniously for their mutual benefit. They see Caribbean living standards rising day by day, aided by expanding, profitable trade, by increasing private investment, by our effective Point Four work, by the basic facilities constructed with the aid of Government loans. Recognizing the effect which bettering conditions in this area must have on their plans to dominate the world, they attack where they think attack will be most effective.

Hence the vicious propaganda against American companies operating in the Caribbean area. By their attacks the Communists seek, of course, to discredit the United States. But they have other objectives too. They want to prevent the development of these republics and the improvement of living standards in them, and they know that increasing foreign investments will endanger their objectives. They seek to turn the Caribbean nations against foreign investment and foreign investors against the Caribbean nations. But if in one Caribbean country a misguided government is dancing to their tune, in all the other independent countries they have little enough to show for their efforts.

If political problems arise in the Caribbean area, we have evolved a set of principles peculiarly well adapted for dealing with them. So long as we follow those principles in endeavoring to settle our differences, the latter should never become serious. In short, these principles are respect for the rights, interests, and individualities of our sister republics, nonintervention in their internal affairs, and cooperation with them in developing their resources, basic facilities, and living standards.

There is, however, a word which I should like to add to that. We expect of our sister republics the same consideration that we strive to show

<sup>2</sup>I. e., the Seventh International Conference of American States, at which the Convention on Rights and Duties of States was signed.

them. Weakness does not confer rights on a nation, and rights cannot be divorced from responsibilities. We have gladly recognized that our sister republics have attained maturity. In the last few days we have again demonstrated that we do not wish to dominate any other people by announcing that this administration would recommend to Congress that Puerto Rico become completely independent if it so chooses. But we do expect of our sister republics a due regard for our views, rights, and interests in return.

The fundamental problems of our Caribbean relations are not, then, the question of Cuban sugar or Panama Canal treaties or expropriations in Guatemala or migrant labor from Mexico. With due consideration on each side for the other's viewpoint, all of these can be solved. The fundamental problem is that, in a narrowing world, smaller, weaker, poorer countries exist so close to us that their people are increasingly anxious to have for themselves the good things of life they see their neighbors to the north enjoying and that the Communists are striving to get them to choose unwisely, even wrongfully, the means of securing them. If our policy is to thwart them, we prefer to think of the problem facing us in more positive terms. It is not enough to analyze it, to appreciate the difficulties we face, and to talk in generalities of the objectives we should seek to obtain. We need a concrete, constructive program to attain those objectives.

The objectives are clear. We want in our relations with our sister republics of the Caribbean to promote peace, mutual security, democratic practices, rising standards of living, economic development. We seek their friendship based on understanding, cooperation, and mutual respect.

The means by which we seek to obtain these objectives are primarily the following:

1. An expanding trade promoted by stability in rules and terms. Since we produce practically none of the staple export products of the Caribbean countries in adequate quantity for our domestic consumption and since indeed our products tend to complement rather than to compete with each other, this is a serious problem today only in restricted sectors.

2. The continuing investment of American private capital in those countries favoring such investment. Men cannot have what they do not produce; capital tools help men to produce; native capital in the Caribbean is woefully inadequate to fill the area's needs, and, therefore, additional foreign capital is needed to raise living standards rapidly. That capital will go only where it is welcomed and fairly treated. The money invested by our private citizens is bettering wages, working conditions, hospitals, and schools, is expanding vital exports, is providing know-how to more and more people, and is enabling people to buy better merchandise at cheaper prices.

3. Government loans to aid in the construction

of basic facilities such as roads, utilities, irrigation, and in the development of agricultural resources.

4. Direct aid for such major mutually beneficial projects as the Inter-American Highway.

5. The dissemination of know-how through scholarships, trainee grants, American libraries, and through our Point Four work.

#### Value of Point Four

I should like particularly to emphasize how much we get for every dollar that we put into Point Four work. I have seen with my own eyes how it is increasing agricultural production and thereby helping the people of the Caribbean area to eat better. Agricultural yields have in some instances been multiplied several times; and, to pick but one example, Costa Rica, which used to import corn, beans, rice, and sugar, is now exporting all of them. The scourges of malaria, yaws, and other pestilences have been virtually eliminated. Pure water has been brought to many villages which never knew it before. Clinics, hospitals, and trained nurses attend to the medical needs of a populace formerly without them. Here is the refutation of the oft-repeated story that our aid does not reach the common man, for millions throughout the Caribbean area have benefited from it.

Even if the means at our disposal were greater, we should not quickly attain our objectives. What we are doing is to build slowly but truly the foundations upon which the nations of the Caribbean area can rise in future majesty. We are at times criticized for not doing more to promote democracy now. I have already mentioned how notably unsuccessful our direct efforts to promote democracy have been. To my mind the proper and the surer way, if at times its slowness makes us impatient, is the course we are now following. By raising living standards, by creating a middle class through trade and economic development, by promoting education through Point Four aid, by the very example our democracy sets for our sister republics, we shall in my opinion set them in their turn on the path to democracy without improper interference on our part.

If I have spoken at length of the social forces working in the Caribbean, I do not wish to over-emphasize their explosive nature. Although communism has established a beachhead in one republic (and has recently been smacked down in an effort to establish another in a European colony), other Caribbean republics are without exception progressing rapidly through stable evolutionary processes. Already the Red Star has clearly passed its zenith in Mexico, Cuba, and some of the other republics. While complacency would be unwise, we can be quietly confident in the progress we are making, and we can devote increased efforts to the sectors in which the battle is still not going

as we  
and e  
For

It wi  
there  
are co  
ocra  
confid  
us, in  
ues, s  
has to  
coope  
thwart  
colon

First

Unde

Press r

The  
by the  
fectiv  
period  
the G  
been a  
proce  
riod o  
the ad  
riod o  
the 31

The  
ationa  
visas  
quota  
grant  
Act.<sup>1</sup>  
as am  
quire  
to be  
to the  
quota  
is not

The  
issued  
Act i  
would  
durin  
belie  
der th  
becom  
40 pe  
rently  
expen  
the si

<sup>1</sup> For  
of the  
the 19  
1953, p

Decem

as well. That is the message of encouragement and exhortation which I wish to bring you today.

For communism will not be beaten by oratory. It will be beaten when the underprivileged, and there are still many of them in the Caribbean area, are convinced that, while communism rants, democracy produces the goods. Let us go forward, confident in our strength to meet the tasks before us, in the soundness of our principles, in the values, spiritual and material, which our way of life has to offer our sister nations. Let us continue to cooperate with them in friendship and trust, to thwart the efforts of a new imperialism to make colonies of us all.

## First Visas To Be Issued

### Under Refugee Relief Act

Press release 647 dated December 2

The Refugee Relief Act of 1953 was approved by the President on August 7, 1953. It became effective immediately upon its approval, the 120-day period provided for the administrative agencies of the Government to put the act into effect having been eliminated from the bill by Congress in the process of its enactment. Instead of a 2-year period of operations with 120 days to get started, the act provides for a maximum operational period of 3 years, 4 months, and 24 days, ending on the 31st of December 1956.

The act authorizes the issuance during its operational period of a total of 209,000 immigrant visas over and above the number of quota and non-quota visas which may be issued to regular immigrants under the Immigration and Nationality Act.<sup>1</sup> Unlike the Displaced Persons Act of 1948, as amended, the Refugee Relief Act does not require that any of the immigrant visas authorized to be issued under its provisions shall be charged to the quota of any country. They are to be non-quota visas. Mortgaging of the quotas therefore is not required under the Refugee Relief Act.

The rates at which immigrant visas are being issued under the Immigration and Nationality Act indicate that approximately 550,000 visas would normally be issued to regular immigrants during the operational period of the Refugee Relief Act. When the 209,000 visas authorized under the Refugee Relief Act are added, the total becomes an estimated 759,000, or approximately 40 percent more than the number of visas currently being issued. Congress has authorized the expenditure through March 1954, of \$3 million by the six agencies of the Government involved in the

operation of the Refugee Relief Program. This amount has been used by the agencies concerned to plan or initiate the Refugee Relief Program and to begin the issuance of visas under it. These agencies are the Department of State, the Treasury Department, the Department of Justice, the Department of the Army, the Department of Labor, and the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, each of which has an important role in the Refugee Relief Program.

The Refugee Relief Act did not create any new agency of the Government, such as the Displaced Persons Commission under the Displaced Persons Act. It was the intention of Congress that the Refugee Relief Act should be administered by the established agencies of the Government previously mentioned. Numerous conferences have been held among the officers of the governmental agencies operating under the Refugee Relief Program and general agreement has been reached on a plan of operations which envisages a clear outline of the authority and responsibility of each agency and the functions each will perform in the administration of the act, all in a coordinated effort to implement the act in the spirit of its enactment.

There are two separate and distinct phases of the Program for the administration of the Refugee Relief Act. First, the cases on hand, in which American consular officers may start issuing visas, and second, the cases which have not yet been developed through the necessary nominating action of American sponsors to the point where visas may be issued.

The act authorizes the issuance of nonquota immigrant visas to 15,000 preference-quota immigrants whose cases are backlogged against the quota in Italy, 2,000 such cases in Greece, and 2,000 such cases in the Netherlands. At the present time there are more than 15,000 such cases in Italy, although there are not 2,000 either in Greece or in the Netherlands. However, the cases in hand are considered as requiring first attention, as compared with the cases not yet received under the second phase of the program.

Many American citizens have filed petitions with the Attorney General for preference-quota status on behalf of the first phase immigrants; the Attorney General has approved these petitions; and the American consular officers abroad have been authorized by the Secretary of State to grant the preference-quota status in each case. These immigrants are largely within the fourth-preference-quota category, which is a new preference class created under the Immigration and Nationality Act, prior to the enactment of which the aliens concerned were classifiable as nonpreference quota immigrants. This new preference-quota class consists of the brothers, sisters, sons, and daughters of citizens of the United States. Under the Refugee Relief Act the Congress has authorized the issuance of nonquota immigrant visas to 15,000 of these immigrants in Italy. Although the Immi-

<sup>1</sup> For an article on the Refugee Relief Act, see BULLETIN of Aug. 24, 1953, p. 231; for an analysis of the provisions of the Immigration and Nationality Act, see *ibid.*, Feb. 2, 1953, p. 195, and Feb. 9, 1953, p. 232.

gration and Nationality Act did not authorize the granting of preference-quota status to the spouses and children of these immigrants, such spouses and children may be issued nonquota immigrant visas under the Refugee Relief Act, but within the numerical limitations provided in that act.

The program for the issuance of immigrant visas under the first phase of the administration of the Refugee Relief Act is slated to begin at the American Consulate General at Naples, Italy, on December 4, 1953. The first three immigrants who are scheduled to receive their visas under the Refugee Relief Act on that date at Naples are:

1. Michele Sonnino, who will be coming to the United States to join his mother, Mrs. Maria Sonnino, an American citizen residing at 12 Drift Street, Newark, N. J.

2. Maria Tortora, who will be coming to the United States to join her sister, Mrs. Homer Oliverio, an American citizen residing at 790 Locust Avenue, Clarksburg, W. Va.; and

3. Vincenzo Barone, who will be coming to the United States to join his father, Pasquale Barone, an American citizen residing at 250 Union Street, Brooklyn, N. Y.

R. W. Scott McLeod, Administrator of the Bureau of Security, Consular Affairs, and Personnel of the Department of State, who is also Administrator of the Refugee Relief Program, and Argyle Mackey, the Commissioner of Immigration and Naturalization of the Department of Justice, will be at Naples for the ceremonies when the first visas are issued under the Refugee Relief Program to the aliens mentioned above. They will also survey the progress of plans under way for the administration of the second phase of the Refugee Relief Program in other European countries.

The second phase of the Refugee Relief Program envisages the issuance of a total of 190,000 immigrant visas to refugees, escapees, expellees, and orphans. Under the law the visas are allotted as follows:

Not to exceed 55,000 visas to German expellees residing in the area of the German Federal Republic or in the western sectors of Berlin or in Austria: *Provided*, That the visas issued under this paragraph shall be issued only in the German Federal Republic or in the western sector of Berlin or in Austria.

Not to exceed 35,000 visas to escapees residing in the area of the German Federal Republic or the western sectors of Berlin or in Austria: *Provided*, That the visas issued under this paragraph shall be issued only in the German Federal Republic or in the western sector of Berlin or in Austria.

Not to exceed 10,000 visas to escapees residing within the European continental limits of the member nations of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization or in Turkey, Sweden, Iran, or in the Free Territory of Trieste and who are not nationals of the area in which they reside: *Provided*, That such visas shall be issued only in the area or areas mentioned in this paragraph.

Not to exceed 2,000 visas to refugees who (a) during World War II were members of the armed forces of the Republic of Poland, (b) were honorably discharged from such forces, (c) reside on the date of the enactment of this act in the British Isles, and (d) have not acquired British citizenship.

Not to exceed 45,000 visas to refugees of Italian ethnic origin, residing on the date of the enactment of this act in Italy or in the Free Territory of Trieste: *Provided*, That such visas shall be issued only in the area or areas mentioned in this paragraph.

Not to exceed 15,000 visas to refugees of Greek ethnic origin residing on the date of the enactment of this act in Greece: *Provided*, That such visas shall be issued only in Greece.

Not to exceed 15,000 visas to refugees of Dutch ethnic origin residing on the date of the enactment of this act in continental Netherlands: *Provided*, That such visas shall be issued only in continental Netherlands.

Not to exceed 2,000 visas to refugees, residing within the district of an American consular office in the Far East: *Provided*, That such visas shall be issued only in said consular office district and only to refugees who are not indigenous to the area described in this paragraph.

Not to exceed 3,000 visas to refugees, residing within the district of an American consular office in the Far East: *Provided*, That such visas shall be issued only in said consular office district and only to refugees who are indigenous to the area described in this paragraph.

Not to exceed 2,000 visas to refugees of Chinese ethnic origin whose passports for travel to the United States are endorsed by the Chinese National Government or its authorized representatives.

Not to exceed 2,000 visas to refugees who on the date of the enactment of this act are eligible to receive assistance from the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East: *Provided*, That such visas shall be issued only in the area described in this paragraph.

Not to exceed 4,000 special nonquota immigrants visas may be issued to eligible orphans as defined in this act who are under 10 years of age at the time the visa is issued: *Provided*, That not more than two such special nonquota immigrant visas may be issued to eligible orphans adopted or to be adopted by any one United States citizen and spouse, unless necessary to prevent the separation of brothers or sisters.

There are no applications for visas pending at any of our consular offices under this phase of the program, although many potential applicants have registered at such offices. American citizens will not be able to execute the necessary assurances of housing, support, and employment or the assur-

ances of adoption and proper care of an orphan, as required by the Refugee Relief Act, until the official forms have been printed. These forms should be available very soon. After these assurances are executed by American citizens and they begin to send them into the Visa Office of the Department of State for processing and transmission to our consular officers abroad, a volume of business will develop under the second phase of the Refugee Relief Program. It is not anticipated, however, that this phase of the program will get under way in any appreciable volume, insofar as the issuance of visas is concerned, until the end of March.

#### TEXT OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 10487<sup>2</sup>

##### PROVIDING FOR THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE REFUGEE RELIEF ACT OF 1953

By virtue of the authority vested in me by the Constitution and statutes, including section 11 (a) of the Refugee Relief Act of 1953 (Public Law 203, 83d Congress, approved August 7, 1953), and as President of the United States, it is hereby ordered as follows:

Section 1. The Department of State is designated as the agency of the Government of the United States which shall, subject to the provisions of section 2 hereof, make or prepare the thorough investigations and written reports required by section 11 (a) of the said Refugee Relief Act of 1953, regarding the character, reputation, mental and physical health, history, and eligibility under the said act, of persons seeking admission into the United States under the act.


Section 2. The Department of the Army and such other agencies of the Government as the Department of State may request shall, in accordance with arrangements agreed upon between the Department of State and any such agency, furnish the Department of State such assistance as it may need in carrying out its responsibilities under section 1 of this order.

Section 3. The funds appropriated under the heading "Emergency Migration" appearing in Chapter VII of the Supplemental Appropriation Act, 1954 (Public Law 207, 83d Congress, approved August 7, 1953) are hereby transferred to the Department of State. The Secretary of State may allocate to agencies other than the Department of State such portions of the transferred funds as he shall determine.

Section 4. The Director of the Bureau of the Budget is authorized and empowered to exercise the authority conferred upon the President by the paragraph appearing under the aforesaid heading "Emergency Migration" to transfer not to exceed sixty-five passenger motor vehicles, without reimbursement, to carry out the migration program authorized by the said Refugee Relief Act of 1953.

Section 5. The Secretary of State shall promulgate the regulations provided for in section 7 (a) of the said Refugee Relief Act of 1953.

Section 6. The Secretary of the Treasury shall promulgate the rules and regulations provided for in section 18 of the said Refugee Relief Act of 1953.



THE WHITE HOUSE,  
September 16, 1953.

<sup>2</sup> 18 Fed. Reg. 5635.

#### REGULATIONS AND FORMS

Press release 652 dated December 4

Regulations implementing the Refugee Relief Act of 1953 as prescribed by the Administrator of Security, Consular Affairs, and Personnel of the Department of State were published in the *Federal Register* of December 3, 1953.<sup>3</sup> The regulations prescribed the procedure to be followed by American citizens who wish to sponsor the immigration of aliens under the act and list the official forms which must be used in giving the required assurances of housing, support, and employment on behalf of alien refugees, escapees, expellees, and their spouses and children. Special procedures and forms are prescribed for use in obtaining visas for orphans adopted or to be adopted by American citizens.

Six assurance forms are prescribed for use under the Refugee Relief Act. The proper form to be used in each individual case depends on the following facts:

1. Form DSR-1 is to be used if one American citizen desires to bring into the United States an alien or aliens whose name or names he knows;

2. Form DSR-2 is to be used if several American citizens desire to bring into the United States an alien or aliens whose name or names they know;

3. Form DSR-3 is to be used if one American citizen desires to bring into the United States an alien or aliens who are described only by the skill or training required but are to be nominated by an agent of the sponsor;

4. Form DSR-4 is to be used if several American citizens desire to bring into the United States an alien or aliens who are described only by the skill or training required but are to be nominated by an agent of the sponsors;

5. Form DSR-5 is to be used by an American citizen and spouse who desire to bring into the United States an orphan child under ten years of age already adopted abroad or to be adopted in the United States;

6. Form DSR-6 is to be used by an American citizen and spouse who desire to bring into the United States an orphan child under 10 years of age to be adopted in the United States, if the name of the child is not known to the prospective adoptive parents who designate a recognized social welfare agency to select a child for adoption.

Instructions for the preparation and execution of each of the six official forms are printed thereon. When properly executed the assurance forms, together with the supporting documents required by the regulations and instructions, are to be forwarded to the Director of the Visa Office, Department of State, Washington 25, D. C. The Visa Office, acting for the Administrator of the Refugee Relief Act, will index and process the assurances and will transmit those which are approved by the Administrator to the appropriate American

<sup>3</sup> 18 Fed. Reg. 7783.

consular officer abroad who will thereafter be in a position to accept the application of the alien for the issuance of an immigrant visa under the Refugee Relief Act.

American citizens who wish to bring into the United States an alien or aliens for the purpose of employment, such aliens being identified only by the skill or training required, should designate a public or voluntary agency or an individual as their agent for the purpose of finding and nominating a suitable applicant. This agent after nominating the alien by completing the assurance form should submit it to the Director of the Visa Office, Department of State, Washington 25, D. C. An American citizen may also request the nearest office of the State Employment Service in the United States to act as his agent and to find and nominate a qualified alien.

As assurances of employment required under the Refugee Relief Act must be given by an individual citizen or citizens and not by a corporate sponsor, a corporation or other organization desiring to bring an alien into the United States for the purpose of employment by it may select one of its American citizen officers, such as its employment or personnel manager, to give the necessary assurance of employment. The required assurances of housing and support must also be given by an individual American citizen or citizens.

The assurances must contain the specific address of housing and employment offered by the sponsor. However, in the case of an alien who will be employed by a firm, corporation, organization, or individual engaged in a statewide business, the address of the employment may be given as being within the State concerned, such as "Long Island Railroad, State of New York." A more specific address of the assured housing is required, however, unless the alien or aliens are to be housed by a firm, corporation, organization, or individual having statewide housing facilities available. In the case of a firm, corporation, organization, or individual operating in two or more states the name of the State where the employment and housing will be provided must be furnished, such as "Pennsylvania Railroad, State of Pennsylvania."

Any American citizen or citizens executing an assurance form on behalf of an alien or aliens he desires to bring into the United States may, if he so desires, have his assurance form endorsed or underwritten by a private agency recognized by the Administrator. In such cases the Administrator may not require that all of the supporting evidence be attached to the assurance form as required by the instructions printed on the form. In order to become a recognized agency an organization must apply to the Administrator for recognition and must give the necessary assurances, as required by the application for recognition, that such agency will be responsible for the proper resettlement of the alien in the event the original assurances of housing, support, and employment should fail to

materialize after the alien's arrival in the United States. No official form of endorsement or underwriting has been prescribed in such cases, but blank forms of an application for recognition by the Administrator may be obtained from the Bureau of Security, Consular Affairs, and Personnel, Department of State, Washington, D. C.

In view of the requirements and restrictions of the States of the United States in the cases of orphan children being brought within their jurisdiction for the purpose of adoption, and the possibility that such adoptions may fail to materialize because of incompatibility or inability of the adoptive parents to meet the requirements of the courts in various jurisdictions for the adoption of children, the Administrator has required in the regulations that the prospective adoptive parents shall select a recognized welfare organization to underwrite their assurances of adoption and proper care of an orphan child which they desire to bring into the United States under the Refugee Relief Act. In order to obtain recognition for such purposes the organization must satisfy the Administrator that it will, in the event the adoption cannot be completed, assume full responsibility for the resettlement of the orphan and for his care pending the resettlement or that it will secure the services of a recognized child care agency for such care.

If an orphan child under 10 years of age has already been lawfully adopted abroad by an American citizen and spouse, the regulations provide that suitable evidence has to be presented to the American consular officer to whom the child applies for a visa that the child will receive proper care once admitted to the United States.

An American citizen who has no spouse may not bring an orphan child into the United States under the Refugee Relief Act regardless of whether such child has already been adopted abroad or is intended to be adopted in the United States. Such children may apply for immigrant visas under the regular immigration laws.

The prescribed assurance forms will, it is expected, be supplied by the Government Printing Office and will be available for distribution during the second half of this month at the Visa Office of the Department of State and at the field offices of the Immigration and Naturalization Service in the United States.

## Program for Aiding Refugees From Iron Curtain Countries

White House press release dated December 8

The U.S. program for helping escapees from the Soviet and satellite states, started in the spring of 1952, will continue under a \$9 million authorization by President Eisenhower.

The funds for the escapee program come from the mutual security appropriations, and the pro-

gram itself is under the direction of the Foreign Operations Administration.

In Western Europe today there are more than 17,000 escapees from behind the Iron Curtain, most of them in camps. Through the escapee program in the last year and a half, more than 6,000 other escapees have been aided to useful resettlement, primarily in Canada, Australia, South America, and the United States.

The escapee program is directed at the ultimate resettlement of the escapees. It provides temporary care and maintenance for them.

In addition to Western Europe, the program operates in the Far East, aiding refugees from Communist China.

In a recent personal message to the escapees, President Eisenhower stated:

I believe that the task of caring for the escapees should have the highest emphasis in the minds of all the Free World, and I am happy that the United States has already done so much of this work. It is the unwavering aim of the United States that the burden of arms, the fear of oppression, and the need of flight shall, some day, be lifted from mankind in order that there may no longer be refugees or escapees, and that all may live in peace and freedom.

A large part of field operations of the escapee program is carried out through contracts between the Foreign Operations Administration and voluntary welfare agencies.<sup>1</sup>

## U.S., Greece Sign Military Facilities Agreement

Press release 557 dated October 12

*Following is the text of a joint U.S.-Greek announcement of the signing at Athens on October 12 of a Military Facilities Agreement between the Governments of the United States and Greece, together with the official text of the agreement:*

In fulfillment of their responsibilities under article III of the North Atlantic Treaty the Government of the Kingdom of Greece, with the approval of His Majesty the King, and the Government of the United States today concluded a bilateral agreement authorizing the United States to improve and use jointly, with the Greek Government, certain airfields and naval facilities in Greece. The agreement is designed to strengthen security in the North Atlantic area as well as maintain international peace and security by facilitating the integration of Greek defenses, developed over the past 5 years with American aid, into the NATO defense system.

This cooperative effort to improve and strengthen collective capacity and resist armed

<sup>1</sup> For an article on the escapee program, see BULLETIN of Aug. 18, 1952, p. 261.

aggression reflects continuing cooperation and close bonds of friendship existing between Greece and the United States.

### Agreement Between the United States of America and the Kingdom of Greece Concerning Military Facilities

The United States of America and the Kingdom of Greece being parties of the North Atlantic Treaty, which was signed at Washington on April 4, 1949, and having regard to their respective responsibilities under the aforesaid Treaty to provide for the security and defense of the North Atlantic Treaty Area, and under Article 3 thereof to develop their collective capacity to resist armed attack, have entered into the following Agreement:

#### Article I

1. The Government of Greece hereby authorizes the Government of the United States of America, subject to the terms and conditions set forth in this Agreement and to technical arrangements between appropriate authorities of the two Governments, to utilize such roads, railways and areas, and to construct, develop, use and operate such military and supporting facilities in Greece as appropriate authorities of the two Governments shall from time to time agree to be necessary for the implementation of, or in furtherance of, approved NATO plans. The construction, development, use and operation of such facilities shall be consistent with recommendations, standards and directives from the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) where applicable.

2. For the purpose of this Agreement and in accordance with technical arrangements to be agreed between the appropriate authorities of the two Governments, the Government of the United States of America may bring in, station and house in Greece United States personnel. United States Armed Forces and equipment under their control may enter, exit, circulate within and overfly Greece and its territorial waters subject to any technical arrangements that may be agreed upon by the appropriate authorities of the two Governments. These operations shall be free from all charges, duties and taxes.

3. The priorities, rates of consumption and charges established for the United States Armed Forces for such services as electric power, sewerage, water supply, communication systems, and freight and personnel transportation by rail, will be no less favorable than those established for the Greek Armed Forces.

#### Article II

1. Equipment, materials and supplies imported by or on behalf of the Government of the United States of America in connection with the construction, development, operation or maintenance of agreed installations and facilities and the official support of the United States Forces, civilian components, and their dependents shall be exempt from all duties, taxes, custom restrictions and inspections.

2. All removable facilities erected or constructed by or on behalf of the Government of the United States of America at its sole expense and all equipment, materials and supplies brought into Greece or purchased in Greece by or on behalf of the Government of the United States of America in connection with the construction, development, operation and maintenance of agreed installations and facilities will remain the property of the Government of the United States of America and may be removed from Greece. No such removal or disposition will be undertaken which will prejudice the mission of the NATO.

3. The United States of America will be compensated by the Greek Government for the residual value, if any, of the facilities acquired, developed and constructed at United States expense under the present Agreement and

not removed or otherwise disposed of in accordance with paragraph 2 of this Article, including those facilities developed or constructed jointly by United States and Greek funds, when such facilities or any part thereof are no longer needed by the military forces of the United States. The amount and manner of compensation shall be in accordance with agreements to be made between the appropriate authorities of the contracting parties. Negotiations as to the method for treating the residual value of these facilities will be without prejudice to agreements within the NATO.

#### Article III

For the implementation of this Agreement the provisions of Article I, paragraphs 3a and 3b of Legislative Decree 694 of May 7, 1948, and the Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of the United States and the

Government of Greece dated February 4, 1953, shall be applied in accordance with terms mutually agreed.

2. The United States Armed Forces in Greece under this Agreement may also establish and continue to use or operate United States military post offices.

#### Article IV

The present Agreement will come into force from the date on which it is signed, and will remain in effect during the period of the validity of the North Atlantic Treaty.

DONE at Athens in duplicate, in the English and Greek languages, the two texts having equal authenticity, this 12th day of October, 1953.

For the  
United States of America  
CAVENDISH W. CANNON

For the  
Kingdom of Greece  
STEPHANOPOULOS

## FOA Grants Allotments to United Kingdom

The Foreign Operations Administration on December 3 announced two allotments to the United Kingdom totaling \$55 million to be used for purchases of agricultural commodities.

One, for \$35 million, made under the FOA defense-support program, will provide dollar funds for various agricultural commodities, including cotton.

The other, for \$20 million, is to be used only for agricultural commodities which are in surplus, under the provisions of Section 550 of the Mutual Security Act of 1953.<sup>1</sup> Out of this \$20 million, \$5 million has been authorized by FOA for purchase of dried prunes. Discussions are going forward for similar authorizations for other surplus farm products under the remaining \$15 million of the allotment.

Section 550 provides that at least \$100 million of the funds appropriated for the mutual-security program this fiscal year is to be used for purchase of surplus U.S. commodities to be resold overseas for foreign currencies. The \$5 million dried-prune purchase will be the second under this surplus commodities provision, the first having been for \$20 million worth of tobacco, also for the United Kingdom.

Under the defense-support program, for which the \$35 million allotment was made, FOA finances commodity purchases by participating countries in support of their defense effort. Such financing is an aid to the balance-of-payments situation of the country.

Each authorization under grant defense-support allotments is matched by the recipient with an equivalent amount of local currency counterpart.

<sup>1</sup> For text of section, see BULLETIN of Nov. 9, 1953, p. 639.

The counterpart fund is used for local currency expenditures approved by FOA as consistent with the mutual security program.

FOA allotments for Western Europe for the current fiscal year now total \$106 million, as follows:

East Germany (food relief) . . . . .	\$15,000,000
Greece . . . . .	5,000,000
Spain . . . . .	11,000,000
United Kingdom . . . . .	35,000,000
United Kingdom (Section 550) . . . . .	40,000,000
Total . . . . .	106,000,000

## Talks with Canada Concerning New Committee on Trade

White House press release dated December 4

Preliminary discussions were held on December 4 at Ottawa between officials of the United States and Canadian Governments looking toward the first meeting of the newly established Joint United States-Canadian Committee on Trade and Economic Affairs.<sup>1</sup> Both President Eisenhower and Prime Minister St. Laurent have expressed the hope that the work of this Committee can get under way as soon as possible.

The Canadian officials present were Lester B. Pearson, Minister for External Affairs; C. D. Howe, Minister of Trade & Commerce.

The United States officials present were Sherman Adams, the Assistant to the President of the United States; Gabriel Hauge, Administrative Assistant to the President; Howard Gordon, Administrator of the Commodity Stabilization Service, U. S. Department of Agriculture; John Leddy, Director of Office of Economic Defense and Trade Policy, Department of State.

<sup>1</sup> For the announcement of the establishment of the Committee, see BULLETIN of Nov. 30, 1953, p. 739.

## Forced Labor in the Soviet Union

*Statements by Mrs. Oswald B. Lord  
U.S. Representative to the General Assembly<sup>1</sup>*

### ANALYSIS OF COMMITTEE'S REPORT

U.S. delegation press release dated November 18

During the last 2 months the Third Committee has dealt with many important issues, taking affirmative action designed to advance the general well-being of the peoples of the United Nations. By overwhelming majorities the Committee has reaffirmed its concern with the fate of refugees left behind by the ravages of war or driven from their homes by ruthless governments and has approved a program of practical action in the social field.

On this and other occasions this great Assembly of Nations has reflected the determination which gave life to the Charter of the United Nations, the determination to promote social and economic progress, to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights and the dignity and worth of the human person, and to achieve international cooperation in solving international problems of an economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character. This determination reflects the fact that economic and social progress and the observance of fundamental human rights are the foundations on which a lasting peace must be built.

It is this fact which has prompted my Government to request that the item "Evidence of Existence of Forced Labor" be included in the agenda of the present session of the General Assembly. By "evidence of existence of forced labor" we do not mean evidence of isolated cases of forced labor perpetrated in violation of national laws. Such cases obviously do not come within the purview of the United Nations. Nor are we concerned here with those forms of labor, strictly limited and defined under criminal legislation, which are imposed upon common criminals under due process of law. Such forms of forced labor are the legitimate field of interest of penologists and, as a matter of fact, have been and continue to be the object

of a study of individuals and groups operating under the auspices of the United Nations.

What we are concerned with here is something quite different. We are concerned with evidence of the existence of systems of forced or "corrective" labor employed as a means of political coercion or punishment or which are on such a scale as to constitute an important element in the economy of a given country. We are concerned with forced labor imposed not upon common criminals but upon individuals who may be suspected of being out of sympathy with their government, and who may be condemned to forced labor without proper trial, without adequate right to defense, and in violation of their fundamental human rights. We are equally concerned with systems so all-embracing and with such a great number of victims as to make their labor an important part in the achievement of the economic objectives of the State. In other words, we are concerned with the evidence of wholesale suppression of human rights imposed and approved by governmental action.

I submit, ladies and gentlemen, that if there is evidence of the existence of such systems anywhere in the world we cannot remain indifferent. Such systems, by deliberately flaunting and destroying human rights, are a clear violation of the Charter of the United Nations under which we have pledged ourselves not to destroy but to promote fundamental human rights. They are a threat to peaceful commerce among the nations, for the product of slave labor becomes a threat to the living standards of workers everywhere. If it can furthermore be shown that this social disease is so virulent as to be spreading into the social fabric of more and more countries, then indeed we are faced with a problem of paramount importance to all of us.

Unfortunately, there is such evidence. Exposés of forced-labor conditions in certain parts of the world have been continuing for several years. In spite of the most rigid censorship and suppression of news, information became available which re-

<sup>1</sup> Made on Nov. 18 and Nov. 27 in Committee III (Social, Humanitarian and Cultural).

vealed that forced labor for purposes of political coercion and as an integral and important part of the economy of certain countries did indeed exist and existed on a scale unknown in the history of the world. There have been indications that these systems were applied with a ruthlessness and a brutality which defies the imagination of civilized man.

It is only recently, however, that comprehensive proof has been collected by an undeniably competent and neutral body. This proof is contained in the *Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Forced Labor*.<sup>2</sup>

The *Ad Hoc Committee*, as most of us are aware, was jointly set up by the United Nations and the International Labor Organization. It is a fact-finding Committee composed of three outstanding persons known throughout the world for their impartiality and their objectivity.

Its chairman, Sir Ramaswami Mudaliar of India, is one of the founders of the United Nations. In San Francisco, in 1945, he presided over the Committee which drafted the economic and social chapters of the United Nations Charter. His untiring efforts in the cause of human progress have made him one of the great men of our age. His colleagues on the Committee are both outstanding jurists schooled in the highest standards of judicial procedure and the sifting of evidence.

Their report is one of the most carefully documented publications ever produced by either the United Nations or the International Labor Organization.

Unfortunately, the report was published too late to permit appropriate examination by the Economic and Social Council and the International Labor Organization at their sessions last summer. We trust that its conclusions will, however, be given the consideration which they deserve by the Council and by the International Labor Organization at their next sessions. It is therefore not my intention to review this report now in all its details; nor is the General Assembly required to take direct action on the report at this time.

#### Need for Focusing Public Attention

On the other hand, the very existence of this document and the evidence which it produces make it essential and inescapable that public attention should be focused without delay on what is one of the greatest social evils of the modern world.

As my Government noted in the explanatory memorandum accompanying our request for submittal of this item to the General Assembly,<sup>3</sup> the *Ad Hoc Committee* concluded that:

<sup>2</sup> U.N. doc. E/2431. For text of the section relating to the Soviet forced labor system, see BULLETIN of Aug. 10, 1953, p. 167.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, Aug. 31, 1953, p. 299.

... its enquiry has revealed the existence of facts relating to systems of forced labour of so grave a nature that they seriously threaten fundamental human rights and jeopardise the freedom and status of workers in contravention of the obligations and provisions of the Charter of the United Nations.

We owe it to the victims of these pernicious systems of forced labor not to remain silent; we owe it to the free peoples of the world whose well-being may be threatened by this international cancer.

The central source of infection is the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. A careful reading of paragraphs 437, 438, 441, and 549 of the report shows that this was the most significant conclusion of the Committee; in its more detailed analysis the Committee includes ample evidence to show that it is the Soviet Union, closely followed by its satellites, which has instituted a system of forced labor so all-embracing, so ruthless in its application, as to overshadow all other evidence of forced labor found in other parts of the world.

Forced labor as a means of political coercion and as an essential part of the national economy appears so deeply rooted in Soviet Communist thought and practice as to be identical with the system. Soviet communism and forced labor go hand in hand—it is as simple as that.

This is a grave statement. It rests on the evidence contained in some 100 pages of closely printed text dealing with the U.S.S.R. in the *Report of the Ad Hoc Committee*.

What is that evidence?

1. To begin with, Soviet laws and regulations make explicit provision for several kinds of forced labor. The Committee cites an impressive number of legal texts, codes, and administrative regulations published by the U.S.S.R., its constituent republics and the satellite countries, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Hungary, Bulgaria, and Rumania. It quotes copiously from official interpretations of these texts. All of these official sources make it crystal clear that the Soviet bloc States have penal systems which provide for the imposition, on a large scale, of various types of forced labor.

By way of example, I should like to refer to the Committee's analysis of the Penal Code of the Russian Soviet Republic, which provides for three types of forced labor. These are corrective labor without deprivation of liberty, deprivation of liberty with corrective labor, and exile with corrective labor. (Cf. *Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Forced Labour*, p. 469 ff.)

*Corrective labor without deprivation of liberty* is imposed for periods of one day to one year and is performed at either the convicted person's normal work place or on work organized by the corrective labor authorities. This type of forced labor is meted out for lesser offenses such as lateness at work.

*Deprivation of liberty with corrective labor* means confinement in either colonies or camps. Sentences range up to 25 years. The colonies are of several types. One of these is the mass labor

color  
"per  
who  
who,  
const  
subj  
Lab  
Th  
corre  
from  
speci  
to th  
labor  
of R  
nanc  
one o  
nati  
follo

The  
the r  
tion  
made  
oppo  
exile  
this p  
social  
Sovie  
oppo  
a pow  
a sem  
crime  
Trude

2.  
hensi  
of a  
not  
ship.  
"clas  
cited  
entir  
State  
of cl  
The  
sian  
state  
R.S.  
of th  
legal  
a da

The  
emer  
in th  
Andr  
on S  
task  
sum  
enem  
the  
weap  
ing t  
84 o

The  
of C  
to th

Dece

colony, situated in distant areas, which receives "persons from the milieu of class-hostile elements who have been deprived of liberty and workers who, because of the nature of the crime committed, constitute the greatest *class* danger and need to be subjected to more severe conditions." (Corrective Labor Code, art. 33; cf. p. 469 of Report.)

The special purpose of the other type, *exile with corrective labor*, "is to isolate convicted persons from their previous milieu by removing them to specified localities and simultaneously imparting to them a sense of discipline through corrective labor." (Corrective Labor Code, art. 6; cf. p. 470 of Report.) This penalty was introduced by ordinance dated January 10, 1930. Mr. B. S. Utevski, one of the leading Soviet experts on Soviet criminal law, describes this type of forced labor in the following terms:

The importance of exile as a punishment increased in the reconstruction period when the accentuated opposition of class-hostile elements to socialist construction made it necessary to find new ways of countering such opposition. At the same time the possibility of organizing exile on the principle of providing persons sentenced to this penalty with a re-education in labour on large-scale socialist construction projects in distant areas of the Soviet Union which were in need of manpower provided opportunities of so arranging exile that, while acting as a powerful repressive measure, it also served to instill a sense of discipline in workers who committed serious crimes. (B. S. Utevski: *Sovetskaya Ispravitelno-Trudovaya Politika*, 1935, p. 48; Cf. Report p. 470.)

2. Second, the primary purpose of this comprehensive system of forced labor is the suppression of any elements of the population which might not be in full accord with Communist dictatorship. This is shown in the repeated reference to "class-hostile elements" in the texts of the laws cited by the Committee. As a matter of fact, the entire penal systems of the several Communist States appear to have been conceived as weapons of class war.

The first article of the Penal Code of the Russian Soviet Republic (official edition of 1950) states that "The aim of the penal legislation of the R.S.F.S.R. shall be to protect the socialist State of the workers and peasants and the established legal order therein against acts which constitute a danger to society. . . ."

This sounds harmless but its full meaning emerges when it is read in the light of a statement in the *Manual of Criminal Procedure* written by Andrei Vyshinsky, a rather well-known authority on Soviet law. He emphasizes that ". . . the task of revolutionary legality is so to organise summary justice and the suppression of class enemies that the courts under the dictatorship of the proletariat are turned into an unerring weapon against class enemies, pitilessly suppressing them and mercilessly dispensing justice." (p. 84 of Report.)

This leaves no doubt that the primary objective of Communist "legality" is to crush all opposition to the regime in power. Anybody who may be

deemed to be out of sympathy with Communist rule, anyone tainted by past affiliation with the bourgeois group or the kulaks becomes liable to punitive action. Suspected thoughts, the possession of the wrong kind of literature, a failure to realize that the party line has changed once again, may cause deprivation of liberty and forced labor.

3. The evidence shows, in the third place, that the legal system is directed so as to diminish effective protections for the individual. To make this kind of "justice" effective it is essential that it should not be hampered by any legal niceties, such as the provision of effective counsel for the defendant or trial before a court.

To achieve "summary justice and the suppression of class enemies," to use Mr. Vyshinsky's words, Soviet law also defines punishable crimes in such a loose way as to be applicable to anyone in disfavor with the regime. Thus Soviet legislation and practice has seen to it that there should be no obstacles on the road to the forced labor colony. It is a case of fitting the crime to the punishment and not the punishment to the crime. Testimony presented to the *Ad Hoc Committee* confirmed that the procedural regulations of Soviet law not only could be used as political weapons against the accused but were also in fact so employed.

#### Criminal Inaction

Let me illustrate some of these points. Article 6 of the Penal Code of the Russian Soviet Republic explains that "any action or *inaction* shall be deemed a danger to society if it is directed against the Soviet regime or violates the legal order established by the workers' and peasants' authority for the period of transition to a Communist regime". (Cf. p. 479 of Report.) Thus not only action but also "inaction" becomes a crime.

In case even language as broad as this should not cover all of those the regime wants to send to forced-labor camps, Soviet jurisprudence has established the principle of analogy. According to article 16 of the Penal Code, "where the present Code makes no express provision for some act which constitutes a danger to society, the basis and limits of responsibility for such an act shall be determined in accordance with those Articles of the Code which cover crimes whose nature is most similar to such an act." (p. 481.) The Soviet publication *Criminal Law* in commenting on this principle states: "The existence of analogy in Soviet penal law is conditioned by the practical requirements of the Socialist State at a given stage of its development." (Cf. Report, p. 481.) In other words, anyone in the U.S.S.R. can be punished for acts which are not listed as punishable acts in the Penal Code. What is more, what at some stage may be a perfectly legitimate act may

become a crime, without any change in the law, at some other time in order to meet "the practical requirements of the Socialist State at a given stage of its development."

Not satisfied with this stretching of their penal legislation like a rubber band, the Soviets have also incorporated in their criminal law the principle of collective responsibility. Thus article 58 (1) (c) of the Penal Code provides that "the other members of the traitor's family who have reached maturity and who were living with him or who were depending on him at the time the crime occurred shall be liable to deprivation of electoral rights and exile for five years to distant regions of Siberia." (Cf. Report, p. 484.) In other words individuals may be punished who cannot even be accused of harboring a dangerous thought.

When the unfortunate victims of this system come to trial they are under further disabilities. They are by no means always provided with counsel for defense. Even those who have such counsel evidently can hardly count on any real help. It is Mr. Vyshinsky again who stated that "The first requirement of a defending counsel is a high sense of political responsibility, superior political qualifications . . . an ability to defend his point of view and fearlessly give battle for his beliefs, not in the interests of his client but in the interest of socialist construction and the interests of our State." (Cf. Report, p. 89.)

Furthermore, and this is perhaps the most shocking example of lawlessness disguised in legal verbiage, people can be sent to forced-labor camps without ever appearing before a court. Special administrative machinery set up by the Secret State Police has been functioning over the years to enable the State to take people from their beds, to separate them from their families, and to send them to far-off regions from which few return.

4. A fourth type of evidence examined by the Committee shows that forced labor is of considerable economic importance in the U.S.S.R. In my earlier quotation from the writings of the Soviet expert, Mr. Utevski, I repeated his mention of "reeducation in labor on large scale Socialist construction projects." The report of the *Ad Hoc* Committee, again quoting from official Soviet sources, has much more to say on the economic importance of forced labor in the Soviet Union. These are its findings (pp. 91-92).

It is evident . . . that, since about 1930, the work of both political and other prisoners has been used in the Soviet Union for *large-scale* public works (e. g., canals, railways and roads), for the development of vast areas with abundant and hitherto unexploited resources of raw materials, and for the economic development of previously uncultivated regions . . . It is also clear . . . that during the war and even after, persons sentenced to corrective labour were still used on *large-scale* projects or in big industrial or farming undertakings . . . All the material the Committee has been able to examine gives the impression that corrective labour *plays a relatively large part in the national economy* . . . Corrective labour camps and colonies appear to be *scattered over the whole of the Soviet Union* but . . . they seem to be mainly lo-

cated in areas far away from the principal centres of population. [Emphasis added.]

One might express these somber facts with more words but hardly with more clarity. The large canals dug in the Soviet Union, the railroads traversing the deserts of heat and arctic cold, the output of snowbound lumber camps in the far-off North where every new day means a new battle for existence—these all have been paid for in the misery and death of untold numbers of slave workers.

5. This brings me to a fifth point, on which the report furnishes only limited information, the conditions of life in Soviet labor camps. In its efforts to base its conclusions essentially on published laws and regulations the *Ad Hoc* Committee did not find it proper to arrive at any categorical statement of its conclusions on that score. Nevertheless, the Committee was evidently impressed by the testimonies of former inmates of such camps. Thus we read on page 94 of the report:

The very large majority of the former prisoners whose testimonies the Committee has been able to examine have . . . described the conditions as being inhumane, particularly as regards the accommodation and the food; they allege that the rationing system is made quite unbearable by the subjection to production norms which no normal man can possibly fulfill. [However,] despite all the often moving and apparently sincere evidence provided in these testimonies, the Committee refrains from drawing any general conclusions, since the rule it has consistently followed is to base its conclusions mainly on laws and regulations.

The Committee might have gone further, even on the basis of regulations alone. For example, the regulations of 1937 for the supply of the Ukhta-Pechora camp provide eloquent evidence. It was those regulations that stipulated smaller rations for forced laborers than for guard dogs and provided that, when a prisoner could not fulfill the excessive work norms, he would get less food; thus a vicious circle of declining rations, declining strength, and declining output was established. It is a vicious circle which only too often is broken only by death.

6. Finally, the evidence conclusively demonstrates that the Soviet forced labor system is not limited to penal labor, to which I have so far confined my remarks. In fact, it is of special importance that, in the considered opinion of the *Ad Hoc* Committee, even the so-called free worker in the Soviet world is a forced laborer. On p. 98 the Committee report states:

Soviet legislation makes provision for various measures which involve a *compulsion to work or place restrictions on the freedom of employment*; these measures seem to be applied on a large scale in the interests of the national economy and, considered as a whole, they lead, in the Committee's view, to a system of forced or compulsory labour constituting an important element in the economy of the country. [Emphasis added.]

What it means for the workers of the Soviet bloc to deal with one monopolistic employer who, being the government, has all the power of a

modern state, is clearly indicated in the *Ad Hoc* Committee report.

Every Soviet citizen can be transferred from one job to another, temporarily or permanently, at the pleasure of the authorities. If he refuses to comply with such an order, he is liable to imprisonment. The same punishment is meted out if he leaves his job without official consent. "In the Committee's view," to quote the report once more (p. 97) :

... whole groups of persons are obliged by order of the public authorities to take up, or remain in, a given job, against their will if necessary, and may be penalised for not doing so. Such measures, applied on a large scale in the interests of the national economy, lead, in the Committee's view, to a system of forced or compulsory labour constituting an important element in the economy of the country.

It is important to realize that the coercive features of Soviet labor conditions have increased as the years have passed. The worst features of compulsion came into existence not as experiments of the turbulent revolutionary years; they were added in the 1930's and thereafter. Nor can they be justified as war requirements, for now, 8 years after the war, these regulations are still on the books. Thirty-six years of Communist planning and Communist indoctrination have passed and have left the Soviet people enmeshed in an all-encompassing system of forced labor.

Mr. Chairman, after examining such incriminating evidence, which was before it in much greater detail than I have reflected here, the *Ad Hoc* Committee had no choice but to come to the decisions which it made: Namely, that the penal legislation of the U.S.S.R. "constitutes the basis of a system of forced labor employed as a means of political coercion or punishment for holding or expressing political views, . . . [that] this legislation is in fact employed in such a way," and that this system plays a role "of some significance in the national economy"; and, further, that "Soviet legislation . . . [involving] a compulsion to work or [placing] restrictions on the freedom of employment . . . seems to be applied on a large scale in the interests of the national economy and, considered as a whole, [leads] . . . to a system of forced or compulsory labor constituting an important element in the economy of the country."

I have so far largely dealt with evidence of forced labor in the U.S.S.R., while stating that the same systems with variations exist in other Soviet bloc countries. I shall not take up the time of this Committee with a detailed recital of the pertinent evidence.

#### Conditions In Satellite Countries

Only a few remarks. The laws, methods, and institutions of the so-called popular democracies copy the Soviet pattern, although the report indicates that they differ somewhat in detail. The Committee also observes, however, (par. 550) that

there is a tendency for the satellites to make their forced-labor legislation more severe in imitation of the Soviet system. We find in the satellites the same types of forced labor; the same attempts to use it for the suppression of "class enemies"; the same judicial and administrative processes; the same disregard for the rights of the individual. Anyone who wants detailed proof of these assertions may read the sections of the *Ad Hoc* Committee's report which relate to those countries.

It is a matter of great regret that the *Ad Hoc* Committee did not find it possible to complete its documentation on conditions in Communist China. From information in the possession of many of us, it is only too evident that the Communist rulers of the Chinese mainland have proved apt pupils of their Soviet masters. Thus, another great people has been deprived of its fundamental human rights and delivered to the jailers.

Ladies and gentlemen, the facts which have been brought before us are conclusive. If any further proof were needed it could be found in the attitude and reaction of the representatives of the Soviet world whenever the question of forced labor has been raised in the United Nations. In the course of the debates in the Economic and Social Council leading to the establishment of the *Ad Hoc* Committee, the delegates of the U.S.S.R. and its associates treated all allegations of the existence of systems of forced labor in their orbit as a figment of the imagination. Without the slightest attempt to refute the mountainous material supporting the charges, they asserted that Soviet laws and their application were "excellent," "humanitarian," and "progressive," and that "forced labor was non-existent." (Report, p. 456.) Any statement to the contrary was, to quote the Communist spokesmen, "tendentious, inaccurate, and entirely unreliable," "completely false," "a pure invention," "a gross libel," "a slanderous campaign," "inadequate," "mistranslated and distorted," "fabricated by German fascists," "testimony obtained by torture," "grossly libelous and defamatory," invented "to stir up hatred," "a flagrant violation of the truth," "an attempt at political blackmail," "sensational trickery, based on the testimony of traitors," "baseless and of a scurrilous nature," "completely incomprehensible," and so on. (Cf. Report, pp. 455-464.)

I submit that this line of invective does not carry conviction. We are even less impressed by two other official statements on the subject quoted in the report of the *Ad Hoc* Committee. Late last year the *Ad Hoc* Committee submitted to the Governments concerned a summary of the accusations and the supporting documentary evidence, inviting their comments. Only two Soviet bloc Governments even indicated that they had received the request. Both replies are worth quoting. The Polish "answer" runs as follows: "The Delegation of the Polish People's Republic to the United Nations herewith returns a report containing the slanderous accusations against Poland

of the so-called *Ad Hoc* Committee on Forced Labour" (p. 317). And the Soviet delegation "herewith returns, *unexamined*, the documents attached to the Secretariat's letter of 22 November 1952, since these documents contain slanderous fabrications concerning the Soviet Union" (p. 519). These statements condemn themselves. The Poles, however, have apparently not succeeded fully in their task of socialist "emulation," one ultimate goal of which seems to be the ability to judge material without bothering to examine it.

The Soviets stand condemned still further in the light of official Soviet bloc statements of more recent origin. Early in April 1953, the new Soviet Government revealed that its police used "inadmissible methods" in extorting confessions in the notorious "doctors' plot." The Prime Minister of Hungary admitted that police and courts have violated "the fundamental principles of lawfulness," that the Communist bureaucracy exhibited an "incredibly brutal and soulless attitude," that it "offended the sense of justice of the population and undermined their faith in the rule of law." Maybe this sudden candor was only a tactical move in the power game among rival despots; past experience does not inspire us with confidence in Communist utterances and promises. In this context it is noteworthy to quote the Committee's reaction to the Soviet amnesty of March 27, 1953. The report states that this amnesty

... is granted to persons who have committed crimes not constituting a great danger to the State, but not to persons with sentences longer than five years for counter-revolutionary crimes and certain other serious offenses. (Report, p. 87).

Thus it is clear that forced labor "as a means of political coercion or punishment for holding or expressing political views" has not ceased in the U.S.S.R.; the amnesty and the promised penological reform will not even touch political persecution.

Mr. Chairman, ladies and gentlemen, there is evidence, striking evidence, shocking evidence, overwhelming evidence, that forced labor is practiced in certain parts of the world on a gigantic scale and in flagrant violation of all concepts of human rights. There have grown up in this 20th century new systems of slave labor more comprehensive and more brutal than any slave labor system of the past.

Is there anything we can do about it, the United Nations can do about it? No resolution we might pass nor any convention we might draft will be the final solution.

But there are actions which can be taken, which must be taken, unless we want to become parties to this gross violation of the obligation set forth in the Charter of the United Nations to promote human rights and not to destroy them.

I submit that we can and we must throw the spotlight of public debate on the kind of conditions which I have described, in the hope that the

opinions of this great General Assembly and of the Nations which it represents may lead to remedial measures which only the authors of these systems can take.

We can and we must reaffirm our faith in basic human rights and the importance which we attach to the immediate abolition of systems of forced labor, whether employed as a means of political coercion or punishment for holding or expressing political views, or on such a scale as to constitute an important element in the economy of a given country. My country for one wants to be on record as being unalterably opposed to any such systems wherever they may exist.

We can and we must invite such competent bodies as the Economic and Social Council and the International Labor Organization to give, as a matter of urgency, priority consideration to the report of the *Ad Hoc* Committee with a view to appropriate action designed to assist in the abolition of all such systems.

Finally, we can and we must give the countries within the Soviet orbit and all other countries against which there may be allegations, yet unanswered, another opportunity to let us have their comments and observations.

The resolution which has been introduced for your consideration reflects these moral imperatives. I commend it to your earnest consideration.

#### REPLY TO CHARGES BY SOVIET BLOC

U.S. delegation press release dated November 27

I am grateful to you, Mr. Chairman, for having given me this opportunity to reply to some of the statements made in the course of this debate. I do not want to abuse this privilege in any way and therefore shall be brief.

The most striking aspect of this debate is that it has offered us and the world an outstanding example of Soviet tactics and propaganda. Faced with incontrovertible evidence of the large-scale existence of forced labor within their territories, they resorted to two well-known devices.

They poured out a stream of invective, centered on my country and upon the members of the *Ad Hoc* Committee. And, running short of invective, they attempted to divert the attention of this Committee away from the subject under discussion and toward issues unrelated to the matter before us.

As to the first device—I will not demean myself and meet invective with invective, nor is there any need for me to reply to the scurrilous attacks on the integrity of the group of eminent experts who have given us the *Report on Forced Labour*. Other speakers have already expressed their indignation over these attacks. I should like to submit, however, that the attacks on the Committee constitute a serious threat to any attempts of the United Nations to ascertain facts by way of objective and impartial Committees of Experts. If such

attacks are left unchallenged, it will be increasingly difficult for the United Nations to secure the services of eminent men and women, for no one likes to become the object of a "smear" campaign.

As to the diversionary efforts of the Soviet speakers, if we attempt to answer their irrelevant charges against the United States and its people, we shall play into their hands and will be diverted from the real issue. We fall into their trap and help them to divert attention from the real issues. On the other hand, if we do not reply to their fantastic statements, our silence may be taken as consent.

I shall try to keep to a middle course and give you only a few illustrations which will show up the utter irrelevancy and outright falsehoods of the charges made by speaker after speaker from the Soviet world.

At the core of the Soviet diversionary maneuvers is a simple sleight of hand. They use the old Soviet trick of distorting the meaning behind a word and of solving their problem by way of semantics. "Forced labor" under their definition is no more compulsory labor enacted by force but exists wherever land and the means of production are privately owned. According to them this means ruthless exploitation, constantly lowered standards of living, hunger and disease, and crime.

Now the idea of the progressively increasing exploitation of the working class under a free economy is a shopworn slogan of Communist dialectics, but it hardly coincides with the facts and indeed was almost out-of-date when Marx first formulated the theory.

In trying to prove their thesis, the Soviet speakers unrolled before our eyes an utterly fantastic and perverted picture of alleged conditions in the free world and specifically in the United States. Let us look at some of the real facts. The basic measure of the benefit to the individual by any economy is his real wage. The real weekly wage of all workers employed in manufacturing in the United States (expressed in 1947-49 dollars) has risen from \$25.66 in 1914 to \$40.17 in 1939, \$57.81 in June 1950, and \$62.56 in June 1953.

This means that the average American citizen can now purchase about 2½ times as much in the way of food, housing, clothing, recreation, and other material and social benefits as he could in 1914. In terms of comparative returns of this system, I have here an interesting little article which we ran across in the *New York Post* during the speech of the representative of Czechoslovakia. This article says: "A 20th Century Fund survey disclosed today that the 1948 per capita income in the United States was \$1525.—in Russia \$181." These figures speak for themselves.

Let us take education as another example. We are accused of spending only .04 percent of our budget for education. Now the United States, as this Committee knows, is a federal state and education is a state, not a federal function. Just to

set the record straight—the United States spent approximately \$11 billion on primary and secondary education last year, plus about \$2 billion for new school buildings. Between 98 and 99 percent of the children of school age were in school.

The representative of Czechoslovakia said with great pride that 47,000 people were taking higher education in Czechoslovakia last year. This works out to about one person in 266. In the United States, may I state with modest pride, there were 2,400,000 persons in institutions of higher education, or one in 66.

#### Status of Nonwhites

We are also informed that the status of nonwhites, including Negroes, in the United States, is not as good as that of whites. Certain figures were cited to demonstrate this in connection with the mortality rates, life expectancy, and types of employment. The United States has never claimed that conditions in the United States are perfect. We have never claimed that exploitation of "man by man" can be abolished by waving a wand. What was not pointed out to the Committee, however, is the continual progress being made in the United States concerning the very points which he has raised. Let me give you a few illustrations.

The representative of Czechoslovakia said the nonwhite death rate of 12.6 per thousand compared to 8.4 for whites. He did not say that the Negro death rate has been steadily reduced from 27.8 per 1,000 population in 1900 to 12.6 in 1949, a drop of over 50 percent.

He said that the Negro life expectancy was shorter than that of whites. He did not say that life expectancy at birth for Negro males has been increased from 47.1 years in 1919-21 to 58.6 years in 1949; for Negro women from 46.9 years in 1919-21 to 62.9 years in 1949. Thus there has been an 11.5 percent increase in the life expectancy of nonwhite males and a 16 percent increase for nonwhite females, while the increase for whites has been only 9.6 percent for males and 13 percent for females.

He said that Negroes were restricted to agriculture. He did not say that U.S. Bureau of Census figures for 1950 show that only 13.5 percent of the employed Negro men were farmers and farm managers compared to 21.1 percent in 1940, and that only 11.3 percent in 1950 were farm laborers and foremen compared to 20 percent in 1940. This shows a movement of approximately one-third of the Negro farm population out of agricultural pursuits during this decade and is hardly consistent with charges that Negroes are compelled to work on agricultural pursuits.

The representative of the Ukraine made broad, general charges of peonage. It was not stated that we have strict laws against peonage, which is a crime, and that these laws are enforced.

There were only 55 complaints of peonage in the whole of the United States in 1952.

The representative of Poland charged that the United States is exploiting the "wetbacks." This charge has already been refuted by the honorable delegate of Mexico. The United States and the Mexican Government closely cooperate in meeting this problem. In the fiscal year 1953, we apprehended and returned 839,149 of these illegal immigrants at considerable expense to our governments.

Mr. Chairman, I want to make it very clear that the United States Government does not condone any kind of exploitation, whether in the United States or abroad. For those people in the United States whose conditions are not adequate we are continually concerned and are taking corrective measures.

#### References to Taft-Hartley Law

Only one significant reference has been made to laws or regulations, the indisputable facts upon which the *Ad Hoc* Committee based most of its conclusions. That was to the Taft-Hartley Law, on which a considerable amount of time was spent repeating numerous condemnatory quotations by American Trade Union leaders and other American sources. I would remind the Committee, first of all, that some of these spokesmen may be out of office but they are also out of jail. They have not been branded by the United States Government as foreign provocateurs; they have not been bound at forced labor, nor have their families been put to any disabilities.

As to the substance of the law, it obviously has no place in this debate. Does the Taft-Hartley Act provide for punishment in forced labor camps or colonies? No. Does it allow forced labor without deprivation of liberty on sentence of a court? No. Is it directed against "class enemies" or "foreign provocateurs"? No. In what way then is the Taft-Hartley Act pertinent to our inquiry here?

William Green's characterization of the Taft-Hartley Law as a "slave labor" law has about as much relationship to the kind of horrible problem we are considering here as Mr. Baroody's recent description of a few minutes overtime in Committee III as forced labor.

But let us turn back to the real issue—the revelations of forced labor in Soviet Communist areas of the world, the kind used in camps and in colonies, often similar to the concentration camps of Nazi Germany, under armed guard and under the compulsion of a dictatorial state.

The Soviets have also attempted to explain away some of their own laws. They tell us that some provisions of the Penal Code of the Russian Soviet Republic are no longer in effect. If procedural protections for Soviet citizens are in fact improving, I, for one, applaud it. The stories

which appear constantly in the press from returned victims of this forced labor system make me doubtful, however.

We might pay more attention to what has not been said. In all of the legalistic arguments, the Soviet bloc did not attempt to disprove the existence of forced labor camps and colonies, of exile with forced labor, of forced labor without the deprivation of liberty, for this appears in Soviet and satellite law and in the facts which have been presented to the world. They did not attempt to conceal that forced labor, or what the Soviet Union representative chooses to call "corrective labor" is employed on a large scale in the interests of the economy of the country. They made no attempt to deny two of the most condemning documents—the Corrective Labor Code and the Regulations of the Ukhta-Pechora Forced Labor Camp.

They made a weak attempt to justify forced labor by characterizing it as an "educative" measure. The *Ad Hoc* Committee examined this argument in some detail. This was the result:

The Committee more particularly notes that a political character is openly attributed by Soviet law and Soviet legal commentaries to the re-education of prisoners of every type. So much is clear from the Corrective Labour Code (Articles 4, 5, 7, 33, and 105) which speaks of "politically educative influences" to be exercised on persons sentenced to corrective labour in any of its forms.

The object, therefore, is not merely to re-educate offenders and so rid them of their criminal leanings; it is at least as much, and probably even more, to correct their political opinions and so eliminate all opposition to the regime.

Reference has also been made at frequent intervals to the proposal of the Soviet Union put forward in the Economic and Social Council for the establishment of an investigating committee composed of 125 union members chosen on the basis of the membership of their constituent bodies. The implication was that this would have been a truly impartial committee. I submit that this has from the start been a smokescreen.

Anyone who will read the resolution which was proposed by the Soviet Union in 1951 will see by its very tone and formulation that it was not a serious proposal but was just another propaganda gesture.

The real attitude of the Soviets stands revealed by the fact that in contrast with other countries they refused to cooperate with any measures proposed or enacted by the Economic and Social Council to get at the facts of the situation including those taken well before the establishment of the *Ad Hoc* Committee.

Mr. Chairman, the Soviet Union has never made a satisfactory explanation in any United Nations organization of its continued disregard of its obligations under the charter to promote human rights and respect for fundamental freedoms. This debate only too clearly proves my point.

However, the Economic and Social Council is still charged with the responsibility of considering the conclusions of the *Ad Hoc* Committee. The

Soviet Union still has time to submit its detailed observations in writing just as the United States, the United Kingdom, and others have submitted theirs. I hope that it will do so, so that the United Nations may move ahead with a productive program aimed at the elimination of this barbaric practice from the world.

In conclusion, just one more word: The resolution before us does not single out any area of the world for condemnation on a political basis. It asks for the abolition of systems of forced labor everywhere. I hope the great majority of the Committee will show its opposition to such forced labor by supporting the Joint Resolution.

#### Text of Draft Resolution on Forced Labor<sup>4</sup>

U.N. doc. A/C.3/L.395  
Dated Nov. 20, 1953

##### THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY,

Recalling the determination of the peoples of the United Nations under the Charter to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights and in the dignity and worth of the human person,

Regretting that the Economic and Social Council at its sixteenth session was unable to consider the conclusions contained in the report of the *Ad Hoc* Committee on Forced Labour (E/2431),

Considering that systems of forced labour constitute a serious threat to fundamental human rights and jeopardize the freedom and status of workers in contravention of the obligations and provisions of the Charter of the United Nations,

Observing that the report of the *Ad Hoc* Committee on Forced Labour has now been placed on the agenda of the seventeenth session of the Economic and Social Council and of the 123rd session of the Governing Body of the International Labour Office,

Considering that in view of this delay there is still time for certain governments which have not yet done so to provide information in response to the *Ad Hoc* Committee's request for comments and observations on the allegations concerning them,

1. *Affirms* the importance which it attaches to the abolition of all systems of forced or "corrective" labour, whether employed as a means of political coercion or punishment for holding or expressing political views or on such a scale as to constitute an important element in the economy of a country;

2. *Invites* the Economic and Social Council and the International Labour Organisation, as a matter of urgency, to give early consideration to the report of the *Ad Hoc* Committee on Forced Labour at their next sessions with this aim in view;

3. *Requests* the Secretary-General to consult with governments which have not yet found it possible to provide information in response to the *Ad Hoc* Committee's request to the effect that they submit such information before the seventeenth session of the Economic and Social Council so that these replies may be brought to the attention of the Council;

4. *Requests* the Economic and Social Council to report on forced labour to the General Assembly at its ninth session.

<sup>4</sup> Sponsored by Australia, Brazil, Chile, Costa Rica, Cuba, Greece, Pakistan, United Kingdom, and United States; adopted by Committee III on Nov. 27 by a vote of 36-5 (Soviet bloc)-10. The General Assembly on Dec. 7 adopted the resolution without amendment by a vote of 40-5 (Soviet bloc)-12 (Afghanistan, Argentina, Burma, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Syria, South Africa, and Yemen).

## Personnel Policy in the United Nations

Statement by James P. Richards

U.S. Representative to the General Assembly<sup>1</sup>

U.S. delegation press release dated November 19

The U.S. delegation had expected, in the discussion of the general subject matter now before us, that we would deal first with the question of whether to appropriate funds to pay the pending awards of the Administrative Tribunal. We believed it would be logical to adopt this procedure and then, in the light of the disposition we had made of the awards, to turn to the Secretary-General's current report on personnel policy and the proposed clarifications of the Staff Regulations.<sup>2</sup> Thus, in considering the Secretary-General's report and possible amendments to the regulations, we would have full knowledge of the situation that faced us in the absence of amendment to the regulations.

However, the chairman of the Committee suggested that we adopt the opposite order of procedure in taking up these items. The Secretary-General indicated that he preferred to have his personnel policy report taken up first, and the majority of members in this Committee appeared to concur. In view of these sentiments, the United States did not wish to press its views on the procedural issue and therefore requested no formal decision by the Committee.

Since we are dealing with the personnel policy report first, I do not intend during our present debate to discuss in detail the recent decisions of the Administrative Tribunal. Nevertheless my delegation believes that action on the reports of the Secretary-General and the Advisory Committee concerning personnel policy requires us to have a clear understanding of the situation in which we now find ourselves and of the manner in which this situation has come about. I will need therefore to speak in general terms about the functioning of the Administrative Tribunal and to

<sup>1</sup> Made in Committee V (Administrative and Budgetary) on Nov. 19.

<sup>2</sup> The report on personnel policy submitted by the Secretary-General to the eighth session of the General Assembly (U.N. doc. A/2583) contains information regarding judgments of the Administrative Tribunal and an analysis, together with texts, of proposed amendments to the Staff Regulations. Among other matters included in the report are recommendations by the Secretary-General for a proposed revision of article 9 of the Statute of the Administrative Tribunal; statements regarding progress in reviewing temporary staff, a new policy concerning the appointment of staff members, and the question of terms of appointment of special categories of staff; problems arising out of the U.S. Immigration and Nationality Act of Dec. 24, 1952, including an opinion of the Attorney General concerning the effect of waivers under section 247 of that act; and investigations by and information received from governments regarding staff members.

touch briefly on certain decisions rendered by the tribunal this year.

Briefly summarized, the present situation is the following:

Twice during this year, holders of the office of Secretary-General have reported fully to the General Assembly on personnel policy.<sup>3</sup> In each of these reports stress has been laid upon the necessity for high standards for U.N. staff members, the generally high standards that have been achieved and are daily reflected in the excellent work of the U.N. Secretariat. It has also been found necessary by two successive Secretaries-General to stress the need of respect for the exercise by the Secretary-General of the discretion vested in him under the charter and the regulations in order that he may successfully discharge his responsibility for maintaining these standards.

My delegation believes that the General Assembly has consistently shown its concern for high standards in the Secretariat and that it has made very clear its concurrence in the need to respect the discretion and grave responsibility of the Secretary-General. It appears to us that the specific recommendations to be found in the present report of the Secretary-General (A/2533 of Nov. 2, 1953) as modified by the Advisory Committee, are amplifications, a detailed spelling out, of powers which have, by the charter and by action of the General Assembly, been legally vested in the office of the Secretary-General from the beginning.

It would seem to us appropriate therefore that, whatever response we make to these recommendations, we act with full awareness of the nature of the present difficulties. Only in this way can we expect to act effectively.

#### **Errors Made by the Tribunal**

These difficulties arise from constructions placed by the tribunal upon directives of this Assembly and upon provisions of the charter which are contrary to the clear intentions of the Assembly and of the parties to the charter. The most recent errors were made by the tribunal in 1953 between the time of Secretary-General Lie's report and the present report of Secretary-General Hammarskjold. They were therefore made with full notice of the seriousness of the problem and awareness of the delicate responsibilities of the Secretary-General upon which they impinged. They overrode decisions taken by two Secretaries-General. They involved repetition, under a new formula, of a basic error of the past as to which the General Assembly had promptly supplied a reclarification. They were made in violation of rules previously elaborated by the tribunal itself as accurate formulations of the real intent and effect of the law established by the Assembly under the charter.

<sup>3</sup> For earlier report see U.N. doc. A/2364 dated Jan. 30, 1953.

The study of the history of this problem prior to 1953 makes it very clear how the present difficult situation has come about. In the early years of the United Nations there was full recognition of the need by the Secretary-General for broad discretionary power to deal with staff problems in the Secretariat. In some quarters, however, there soon developed the tendency toward limiting this discretion of the Secretary-General in favor of fuller guarantees for staff members. By 1947 it was already necessary for the Secretary-General to request a clarification of his discretionary power with respect to the holders of temporary indefinite contracts. The Assembly made the requested clarification by amending the Provisional Staff Regulations, altering article 21 and adding a new article 12-A.

#### **Tribunal's Field of Competence**

The Administrative Tribunal was created in 1949 with a limited field of competence, namely, "to hear and pass judgment on applications alleging non-observance of contracts of employment . . . or of the terms of appointment." It is perfectly clear that, in creating the tribunal, the Assembly did not intend that it should invade the discretionary sphere of the Secretary-General.

It is clear from the record of the debate in the Fifth Committee in 1949 that, with respect to decisions taken by the Secretary-General in the disciplinary field, the Assembly intended the following with reference to the authority of the tribunal:

- (i) That the tribunal *did have* authority to review such actions to determine whether they had been taken in accordance with procedures set forth in the Staff Regulations;
- (ii) That the tribunal *probably had* authority to review these actions to determine whether there was evidence compelling a conclusion that the action by the Secretary-General had been taken in bad faith or had been wholly arbitrary without any basis in fact or reason;
- (iii) That the tribunal *did not have* authority equal or superior to that of the Secretary-General to determine what standards of conduct were to be applied to staff members or to determine whether or not staff members had failed to meet these standards; that it should not try disciplinary cases *de novo*; and that it should not substitute its judgment concerning the facts or the assessment of the gravity of the offense for that of the Secretary-General.

Nevertheless the tribunal quickly adopted the philosophy of limitation upon the discretion of the Secretary-General and, in 1951 in Judgment No. 4, it ignored the Assembly's action in amending the Provisional Staff Regulations in 1947 and reversed the Secretary-General's termination ac-

tion with respect to two holders of temporary indefinite contracts.

Once again the Assembly resorted to clarification by amendment of the Staff Regulations and adopted Regulation 9.1(c). One might have thought that this amendment was a final and effective clarification of the very simple and basic intention of the Assembly to give full recognition to the Secretary-General's wide latitude and discretion in terminating temporary indefinite contracts. Once again the tribunal ignored action by the Assembly and, in the Crawford case, decided this year, reversed the Secretary-General's termination of the holder of a temporary indefinite contract.

The philosophy of the tribunal, that of attempting to limit the Secretary-General's discretion and substituting its judgment for his, was also displayed in the Robinson case in 1952. There, the tribunal invoked a principle certainly not found in the Staff Regulations that the holder of a fixed-term contract is entitled to a specific statement of reasons for the nonrenewal of his contract if he has taken an active role in the affairs of the Staff Association. Without any semblance of proof that the Secretary-General had acted arbitrarily or in bad faith, the tribunal simply presumed that the Secretary-General had so acted when he did not give a new contract to a Staff Association officer whose fixed term contract had expired. In the light of this decision, the Crawford case should probably not have come as a surprise.

Now we are faced not only with the award in the Crawford case but also with awards in 10 permanent-contract cases. In these cases the tribunal was not able to find bad faith or arbitrary action by the Secretary-General. The tribunal quite openly and consciously substituted its evaluation of the conduct of the staff members involved and its assessment of the gravity of their offense for that which the Secretary-General had made after consultation with eminent legal authorities from three countries.<sup>4</sup> Because it came to a different conclusion, the tribunal reversed the Secretary-General's action dismissing these employees. In these cases the tribunal has gone about as far as it is possible to go in assuming for itself the function the charter placed in the hands of the Secretary-General.

#### Alternatives Open to Assembly

In the face of this situation, Mr. Chairman, what possible alternatives does the Assembly have before it?

It can, of course, ignore the whole matter. This would be evading our responsibility for insuring

to member governments that the United Nations is soundly administered. Hence we cannot accept this course.

The Assembly can abolish or reconstitute the tribunal. We certainly have the right and the power to do this. But such a course would not serve to correct the errors in the present decisions and would be a drastic step that should be resorted to only if all other measures fail.

The Assembly can ignore the errors in the present decisions and clarify or amend the present regulations. This course of action will not meet the basic problem. It fails to establish a clear precedent to guide the tribunal. History shows that clarification of the regulations alone has not been adequate in preventing the tribunal from misconstruing its role in relation to the Secretary-General. Therefore, this course offers no real assurance that the tribunal will in the future refrain from an unwarranted intrusion upon the powers of the Secretary-General.

The fourth alternative open to the Assembly is both to refuse the awards which result from the incorrect decisions in the recent cases and to amplify and amend the regulations. This is a course of action which the Assembly has the right and power to take. It establishes clearly and unmistakably the intent of the Assembly as to the respective functions and responsibilities of the Secretary-General and the tribunal. And it has the advantage of avoiding extreme or halfway measures. It is the best possible way of meeting the entire problem presented by the conflict which has arisen over the respective powers of the Secretary-General and the tribunal.

There is, of course, a fifth alternative. This would be to refuse the awards but to make no changes in the regulations. This would establish a clear precedent as far as the issues in these particular cases are concerned. It does not, however, offer as specific a guide to the Secretary-General and the tribunal in other areas of discretion granted to the Secretary-General under the charter.

The United States would support either of the last two alternatives. The United States considers it essential to the maintenance of the charter position and powers of the Secretary-General to refuse to give effect to the recent tribunal decisions and it therefore opposes the awards. It will be prepared to develop later in more detail the reasons why the Assembly should not give effect to the tribunal decisions and should oppose payment of the awards. In addition, the U.S. delegation is prepared to support the proposals of the Secretary-General as amended by the Advisory Committee. We do so in the belief that those proposals simply constitute a clarification of the regulations and will contribute to preventing further inroads on the powers already granted to the Secretary-General under the charter and present Assembly regulations.

<sup>4</sup>For a Department statement on the report of the committee of international jurists, see BULLETIN of Dec. 5, 1952, p. 967.

## The Ewe-Togoland Unification Question

Statement by Mrs. Frances P. Bolton  
U.S. Representative to the General Assembly<sup>1</sup>

U.S. delegation press release dated November 19

The Ewe and Togoland unification question is completely new to me, and I have found our discussion of it intensely interesting. I am particularly grateful to our African friends who have come such a long way to tell us what their people want. Their presence here has added a note of vitality to our discussion and, I am sure, has helped all of us to a better understanding of this important problem.

Mr. Chairman, the United States has consistently maintained that the wishes of the inhabitants themselves should be the most important element in determining whether or not all or parts of the two Togolands should be unified. For this reason we have supported the establishment of machinery to determine these wishes and to make recommendations upon political, economic, social, and educational matters affecting the territories. We hope and believe that the Joint Council for Togoland Affairs can be made to work. It has the great value of affording a democratic means for a mutual exchange of views by the principal political parties in the two territories. If democracy is to work, people with conflicting interests must learn to meet together, to reach decisions on points of disagreement, and to respect those decisions. For this reason my Government considers that the General Assembly and the Trusteeship Council can do most to help the peoples concerned by concentrating on the development of satisfactory machinery for the discussion of Togoland problems.

Mr. Chairman, the main issues of the problem have already been thoroughly elaborated in this Committee. I do wish, however, to take a few moments to explain the two major factors which have led my Government to take the position I have described.

Foremost of these factors is the complexity of the problem. For more than 6 years we have continually examined and reexamined the requests of hundreds of Togoland petitioners. As a member of the Trusteeship Council and the Council's various Committees on Petitions, the United States has carefully and sympathetically studied the wishes of the inhabitants as expressed in these petitions. One of my United States colleagues, moreover, was a member of the Council's first Visiting Mission to the Ewe area. In the course of this intensive study we have analyzed a number of alternative solutions which seem theoretically possible. Thus far, however, we have found each

of these theoretical solutions impractical, primarily because it would be opposed by large numbers of the peoples concerned.

The second important factor which has influenced my Government, Mr. Chairman, is that Togoland opinion is clearly in a stage of evolution. In the beginning, a relatively small number of Ewe leaders asked us to recommend the unification of the Ewe-speaking people who live in British Togoland, French Togoland, and the Gold Coast. As time passed, however, a constructive development of major significance occurred. More and more Togolanders began to take keen interest in their political future. This new political activity, inspired by the United Nations, has already done much to accelerate the political, economic, social, and educational advancement of the area. In the short run, however, the repercussions of this wider popular interest have made the task of the General Assembly infinitely more difficult. We soon learned, for example, that a number of leaders had decided to take up the banner of Togoland unification as opposed to Eweloland unification.

Mr. Olympio<sup>2</sup> has informed us that the All Ewe Conference now fully supports the idea of Togoland unification. It is nonetheless clear that the advocates of Togoland unification do not agree on exactly what kind of unification they desire. It is the feeling of my delegation, moreover, that the tenor of our discussion this year has been somewhat misleading, because we have not had an opportunity to hear representatives of the two groups which oppose Togoland unification. In the northern section of British Togoland, as the second Visiting Mission pointed out, live many people who oppose Togoland unification and who, quite understandably, want to put an end to the boundary which separates them from their fellow tribesmen in the Northern Territories of the Gold Coast. Members of the mission met with considerable numbers of the chiefs, elders, and peoples of this area, and I understand that the spokesmen of the Dagomba people stressed their hope that the 1952 mission would be the last to visit them since they want to become part of the Gold Coast.

The second group which has no representatives here is of course the Togoland branch of the Convention People's Party. Their reasons for opposing Togoland unification, which have been expressed in written petitions to the United Nations, are also quite understandable. They want to participate in a political development which many representatives in this Committee consider to be one of the most promising in the continent of Africa. I speak, of course, of the impending self-government which the people of the Gold Coast are to enjoy. I am sorry to have to express at this point the regret of my delegation at the gratuitous personal attack made by one of the petitioners on

<sup>1</sup> Made on Nov. 19 in Committee IV (Trusteeship).  
For an article on the Ewe problem, see BULLETIN of Jan. 22, 1951, p. 128.

<sup>2</sup> Sylvanus Olympio, representative of the All Ewe Conference, made a statement on Nov. 13 (U. N. doc. A/C. 4/250).

the African leaders of the Gold Coast and on its distinguished British Governor. The impatience and depth of emotion of our petitioners are readily understandable, but such intemperate allegations do their cause a disservice in this Committee and do injustice to the intelligence of their own people.

In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, it is clear to my delegation that the conflicting and evolving opinions of the peoples of the two Togolands make it inappropriate for the General Assembly at this time to recommend any change in the international status of the two territories. We therefore believe that the Assembly at this session should urge the two administering authorities and the political groups concerned to cooperate in making the Joint Council for Togoland Affairs an effective organization for the discussion of Togoland problems.

We are also concerned over the emotional political atmosphere in the territories lest it jeopardize the orderly development of democratic institutions. My delegation was disappointed to find that although the second Visiting Mission attended four mass meetings organized by political parties in British Togoland, it did not take part in such meetings in French Togoland. We hope that all possible steps will be taken, both by the administering authorities and by the rival political parties, to insure that the next Visiting Mission will be able to carry out its task in a calmer political atmosphere. We also hope that the administering authorities will take appropriate steps to disseminate throughout the two territories the full texts of any resolutions adopted by the General Assembly and the Trusteeship Council on the Ewe and Togoland Unification Problem.

## Proposal Advanced at Panmunjom

*Following is the text of a proposal made at Panmunjom by Ambassador Arthur H. Dean on December 8 regarding the Korean political conference and circulated to members of the United Nations on December 11 (U.N. doc. A/2628):*

### I. Composition and place of the political conference.

1. The political conference shall take the form of a conference on an equal footing between the two sides referred to in paragraph 60 of the armistice agreement. The two sides participating in the political conference shall have plenary authority as to its proceedings.

2. The political conference shall have as voting participants: Australia, Belgium, Canada, Colombia, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Ethiopia, France, Greece, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, People's Republic of China, Philippines, Republic of Korea, Thailand, Turkey, Union of South Africa, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom, and United States of America.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup>In presenting this proposal Ambassador Dean said: "Some of the governments on our side may not actually attend the political conference. I understand from unofficial information that it is the present intention of the Government of the Union of South Africa not to attend. There may be one or two others who do not join in this offer or who will not care to attend the Conference for one reason or another."

3. All decisions of the political conference shall be deemed to have been reached by agreement among the voting participants on the two sides referred to in the armistice agreement and the USSR, only if a decision has received the affirmative vote of both sides and the USSR at the political conference. All decisions shall be binding upon each signatory government. Each side shall determine its own procedure as to the manner in which it will signify concurrence or non-concurrence in decisions.

Each voting participant shall be bound only by the specific agreements to which it adheres.

4. In consideration of their responsibilities in connection with the stabilization of the armistice and consequent concern in a peaceful settlement in Korea, and to promote the smooth progress of the political conference, some or all of the governments whose nations are now actually working there or who have current experience in Korea and are currently familiar with its problems, shall be invited by both sides to attend and take part in the political conference without vote on either of the two sides.

The governments so invited shall be entitled to express their views in plenary sessions or committee meetings on any item on the agenda agreed upon by both sides when that item is under discussion by agreement between the two sides, and in accordance with the scheduling of debate and speeches acceptable to both sides.

On this basis the invited governments may participate in the discussion in the political conference. In view of the responsibilities of the two sides for reaching agreement, the invited governments shall not introduce formal motions or proposals.

5. The political conference shall be convened at Geneva, Switzerland.

### II. Time of the political conference.

6. The political conference shall be convened not less than 28 nor more than 42 days after the termination of these preliminary talks.

### III. Procedural matters of the political conference.

7. The agenda of the political conference shall be determined on the basis of the armistice agreement by unanimous agreement between both sides at the political conference as its first order of business after its opening and initial organization.

8. Each government represented at the political conference shall be limited to one representative at the conference table with the right to speak. Each representative as designated in the official list of the political conference shall be entitled to appoint a deputy to sit in his absence, due notification being given to the other side.

9. The rules of procedure shall be decided by unanimous agreement between the two sides and shall include regulations for the conduct of meetings, order of speaking, order of items, and scheduling of the opening and closing of debate.

10. The order and timing of debate, and the schedule of speeches and items for discussion shall be determined by unanimous agreement between the two sides. No representative shall be permitted to speak on any topic not on the agenda and then only in the order on the agenda.

11. The political conference shall establish such committees or subordinate bodies as are agreed between the two sides.

12. The official languages of the political conference shall be English, Korean, and Chinese. The English, Korean, and Chinese texts of all resolutions and documents of the political conference shall be equally authentic. Representatives of the governments invited by the two sides may bring their own interpreters to participate in the conference.

13. Sessions of the political conference shall be held daily, except Sundays or holidays or as otherwise agreed between the two sides.

14. Except as determined by unanimous agreement be-

tween both sides, sessions of the political conference shall normally be closed to the public.

Each side shall be entitled to issue communications to the press following the sessions of the conference.

The conference may meet in executive sessions if both sides agree, each side being free to propose the end of such sessions at any time. Neither side shall issue any communication to the press following executive sessions, except as agreed to by both sides.

#### IV. Administrative arrangements for the political conference.

15. The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall be invited to furnish the joint secretariat for the political conference proceedings and facilities for simultaneous interpretation. This shall not restrict each side, or each government represented, from having such separate secretariat, at its own expense, as it may deem necessary.

16. Before \_\_\_\_\_ each side shall designate representatives to meet at Geneva, Switzerland, together with a representative whom the Secretary-General of the United Nations shall be invited to designate, to prepare recommendations for the consideration of the political conference with regard to:

- (a) Rules of procedure,
- (b) Manner of determining the expenses to be shared equally by the two sides, and
- (c) Related administrative and procedural matters.

Their recommendations shall be subject to ratification at the political conference by the unanimous agreement of both sides.

#### V. Expenditures of the political conference.

17. Expenditures of each delegation to the political conference shall be borne by each government itself. All joint expenses, such as cost of the conference buildings, joint secretariat, and other joint administrative expenses shall be charged on an equal basis to the governments of the two sides.

Done at Panmunjom, Korea, at \_\_\_\_\_ hours on the day of December 1953, in English, Korean, and Chinese, all texts being equally authentic.

### Check List of Department of State Press Releases: December 7-11

Releases may be obtained from the News Division, Department of State, Washington 25, D. C.

Press releases issued prior to December 7 which appear in this issue of the BULLETIN are Nos. 557 of October 12, 647 and 648 of December 2, and 652 of December 4.

No.	Date	Subject
†654	12/7	Withdrawal of Italian banknotes
655	12/8	Reply to Nov. 26 Soviet note
†656	12/8	Aviation talks with Canada
657	12/10	Delegation to NAC meeting
†658	12/11	Appointments to scholarship board
*659	12/11	Tappin biography
660	12/11	Dulles: Departure for NAC meeting

\*Not printed.

†Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.

### PUBLICATIONS

#### Recent Releases

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, Government Printing Office, Washington 25, D. C. Address requests direct to the Superintendent of Documents, except in the case of free publications, which may be obtained from the Department of State.

Technical Cooperation, Rural University of Minas Gerais. TIAS 2501. Pub. 5136. 12 pp. 10¢.

Agreement between the United States and Brazil amending and extending agreement of June 29, 1951. Exchange of notes—Signed at Rio de Janeiro December 10, 1952, and Agreement effected by exchange of notes—Signed at Rio de Janeiro June 29, 1951.

Use of Funds Derived From Sale of Confiscated Property. TIAS 2476. Pub. 5164. 7 pp. 5¢.

Exchange of notes between the United States and Italy—Signed at Rome May 16, 1951.

Joint Policy Declaration Concerning the Korean Armistice. TIAS 2781. Pub. 5179. 5 pp. 5¢.

Declaration—Signed at Washington July 27, 1953.

Military Armistice in Korea and Temporary Supplementary Agreement. TIAS 2782. Pub. 5197. 130 pp. 35¢.

Agreement—Signed at Panmunjom, Korea, July 27, 1953.

Settlement of Costs for Claims Arising Under Article XVIII of the Administrative Agreement. TIAS 2783. Pub. 5198. 7 pp. 5¢.

Exchange of notes between the United States and Japan—Signed at Tokyo March 23, 1953.

### THE DEPARTMENT

#### Abolition of Staffs for Shipping and Inland Transport Policy

Department Circular 70 dated December 1

1. Due to budgetary limitations, the Shipping Policy Staff (SD) and the Inland Transport Policy Staff (IT), of the Office of Transport and Communications Policy, are abolished effective immediately.

2. The functions, supplies, equipment, and personnel of these units are hereby transferred to the Office of the Director, Office of Transport and Communications Policy.

3. The names and positions of personnel to be transferred, together with the effective date of such transfer, will be prepared in accordance with the provisions of RP 353.5.

## Index

Africa		Mutual Security	
Ewe-Togoland unification question (Bolton) . . . . .	876	Program for aiding refugees from Iron Curtain countries . . . . .	852
Aid to Foreign Countries		North Atlantic Treaty Organization	
FOA grants allotments to United Kingdom . . . . .	884	Meeting of NATO ministers (Dulles) . . . . .	854
Asia		Presidential Documents	
KOREA: Proposal advanced to Panmunjom (Dean) . . . . .	877	EXECUTIVE ORDERS: First visas to be issued under refugee relief act . . . . .	859
Atomic Energy		Publications	
Atomic power for peace (Eisenhower) . . . . .	847	Recent releases . . . . .	878
Soviet reaction to U.S. atomic proposal (Hagerty) . . . . .	851	Refugees and Displaced Persons	
Canada		First visas to be issued under refugee relief act . . . . .	859
Talks with Canada concerning new committee on trade . . . . .	864	Program for aiding refugees from Iron Curtain countries . . . . .	862
Caribbean		State, Department of	
Forces for change in the Caribbean (Cabot) . . . . .	855	Abolition of staffs for shipping and inland transport policy . . . . .	878
Economics		First visas to be issued under refugee relief act . . . . .	859
Talks with Canada concerning new committee on trade . . . . .	864	Trade	
Europe		Talks with Canada concerning new committee on trade . . . . .	864
GREECE: U.S., Greece sign military facilities agreement . . . . .	863	Transportation	
Leaders of U.S., U.K., France meet in Bermuda (text of communique) . . . . .	851	Abolition of staffs for shipping and inland transport policy . . . . .	878
U.K.: FOA grants allotments to United Kingdom . . . . .	864	Treaty Information	
U.S.S.R.:		U.S., Greece sign military facilities agreement . . . . .	863
Forced labor in the Soviet Union (Lord) (text of resolution) . . . . .	865	Trust Territories	
Soviet reaction to U.S. atomic proposal (Hagerty) . . . . .	851	Ewe-Togoland unification question (Bolton) . . . . .	878
Western allies propose that four powers meet in January (text of U.S., Soviet notes) . . . . .	852	United Nations	
FOA		GENERAL ASSEMBLY:	
FOA grants allotments to United Kingdom . . . . .	864	Atomic power for peace (Eisenhower) . . . . .	847
Foreign Service		Ewe-Togoland unification question (Bolton) . . . . .	878
First visas to be issued under refugee relief act . . . . .	859	Forced labor in the Soviet Union (Lord) (text of resolution) . . . . .	865
Immigration and Naturalization		Personnel policy in the U.N. (Richards) . . . . .	873
First visas to be issued under refugee relief act . . . . .	859	Name Index	
International Meetings		Bolton, Frances P. . . . .	878
Leaders of U.S., U.K., France meet in Bermuda (text of communique) . . . . .	851	Cabot, John M. . . . .	855
Meeting of NATO ministers (Dulles) . . . . .	854	Dean, Arthur H. . . . .	877
Western allies propose that four powers meet in January (text of U.S., Soviet notes) . . . . .	852	Dulles, Secretary . . . . .	854
Labor		Eisenhower, President . . . . .	847, 859
Forced labor in the Soviet Union (Lord) (text of resolution) . . . . .	865	Hagerty, James C. . . . .	851
		Lord, Mrs. Oswald B. . . . .	865
		Richards, James P. . . . .	873



the  
Department  
of  
State

Order Form

To: Supt. of Documents  
Govt. Printing Office  
Washington 25, D.C.

Enclosed find:

1. (cash, check, or  
money order).

# If you count **YOUR TIME** at a premium . . .

here's your short cut to a quick, clear, and comprehensive understanding of America's position in world affairs. BRIEFS gives you a keen, perceptive picture of significant foreign-policy developments reflected in statements, reports, and documents from all Government agencies.

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE



WASHINGTON, D.C.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

## Foreign Policy BRIEFS

OFFICE OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS

A FORTNIGHTLY  
SUMMARY BASED  
ON U.S. GOVERN-  
MENT STATE-  
MENTS, REPORTS,  
AND DOCUMENTS

VOL. 8, NO. 12, JANUARY 2, 1953

### THE NATION

#### Cross Lakes Parasites

Negotiations with Canada are under way to safeguard the Great Lakes fishing grounds. Destruction of lake trout and other fish by the sea lamprey—a predatory, eel-like marauder which attacks them like a leech and lives off their blood—has made preventive action imperative. Since 1949, some 5 million dollars worth of lake trout alone has been lost annually to this parasite. Committed the State Department:

The immediate purpose . . . is to bring about joint action by the United States and Canada to eradicate this pest. The Fish and Wildlife Service, cooperating with research agencies in Michigan and Ontario, has developed a number of physical and mechanical devices which will control the lamprey, but these must be used on both United States and Canadian shores of the Great Lakes. In addition, it is expected that arrangements will be made to coordinate the fishery research programs of the two countries, the Fish and Wildlife Service, the Ontario Ministry of Natural Resources, and eight State Governments, the Province of Ontario, and the National Governments.

#### Education for Free Men

The role of education in supporting an open society was outlined by Senator Sam Johnson, U.S. alternate representative to the General Assembly. The work of educating America's youth, she stressed, is "crucial in the defense of freedom." American education, she said, "which bears responsibility for effective world-affairs education 'in a nation whose very survival depends on the way it deals with international issues.' And she added:

Education is at the center of the matter, for foreign policy is the education of the people. Its root is in the desires and aspirations of the American people. Foreign policy can only be effective if it draws on the education of the people, an understanding of the facts of international life. Citizens must be able to voice their opinions and to express them effectively, through individual expression, through organized action, and through the media of mass communication, which can have a constructive effect on policy. In the field of public opinion, a nervous response to a real situation is not as effective as a well-considered, individual response to a personal problem.

"Our schools, educational as well as non-educational, must be open to all. The American society of freedom, democratically controlled by boards working in conjunction with responsible teachers, is the only way to meet this challenge. We cannot meet it by shying away from problems. Controversy is the nature of life."

### RICAN REPUBLICS

#### Training

"A Club idea intrigues many a Latin American who knows the value of a club in his country," noted the Agriculture Department's Office of Foreign Agricultural Relations in a recent letter to land-grant colleges interested in overseas farming programs. "In most countries, there is a great need for assistance in the training of rural youth leaders. As part of the 1953 program,

### TRADE

#### European Economic Survey

The twin themes of "trade, not aid" and "increased private investment abroad" highlighted the report of the Presidential mission headed by Secretary of Commerce Charles Sawyer which recently undertook an extensive economic survey of Western Europe.

The mission found "immoderate recovery" in all of the countries it visited, but by U.S. aid programs, but noted that Europe's permanent economic stability lies in expanding production and trade, not in continuing U.S. grants and subsidies. A number of recommendations for achieving this expansion are included in the survey.

It is clear that the time is ripe for a certain degree of policy making. The extraordinary effort made by us and our allies to build up a defense base, as well as to assist in the reconstruction of Europe, must now be given to long-term economic policy.

Such long-term economic planning will, of course, be based from political or military decisions. It will be based on . . . the need to maintain the strength of the free world. There is no reason to feel that this program cannot succeed.

Even though our economic policies are not inspiring and, if political decisions are courageous and wisely made, we feel certain that these countries will enjoy increased prosperity.

#### Private Investment

Extraction of the Mutual Security Agency's "Control Group Investment Service" has been announced as a further stimulus for private investment overseas. The service, which up to last month covered only Western Europe, now includes Asia's program in the Far East, and will be available to countries using the State Department's Technical Cooperation Administration. Through this arrangement, the Agency noted:

Mr. S. of Small Business makes contacts in foreign countries for American companies, capital, equipment, services, patents or processes.

Contact between a United States U.S. Government contact and a firm made by U.S. or other U.S. patent or other U.S.

A U.S. or other U.S. resource private U.S. ob- bly last

other . . .  
20 that absta...

**BRIEFS**—published every 2 weeks by the Department of State—saves you time while giving you a well-rounded picture of this Nation's foreign affairs. For **YOUR** copy, write the Office of Public Affairs, Department of State, Washington 25, D.C. To subscribe use the handy blank below:

Please enter my subscription to **Foreign Policy Briebs**  
1 year (26 issues) . . . \$1

Name . . .

Street Address . . .

City, Zone, and State . . .

